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ABSTRACT  
   
Each of the three essays in this dissertation examine an aspect of health or health 
care in society. Areas explored within this dissertation include health care as a public 
value, proscriptive genomic policies, and socio-technical futures of the human lifespan.  
The first essay explores different forms of health care systems and attempts to 
understand who believes access to health care is a public value. Using a survey of more 
than 2,000 U.S. citizens, this study presents statistically significant empirical evidence 
regarding values and other attributes that predict the probability of individuals within 
age-based cohorts identifying access to health care as a public value. In the second essay, 
a menu of policy recommendations for federal regulators is proposed in order to address 
the lack of uniformity in current state laws concerning genetic information. The policy 
recommendations consider genetic information as property, privacy protections for re-
identifying de-identified genomic information, the establishment of guidelines for law 
enforcement agencies to access nonforensic databases in criminal investigations, and 
anti-piracy protections for individuals and their genetic information. The third and final 
essay explores the socio-technical artifacts of the current health care system for 
documenting both life and death to understand the potential for altering the future of 
insurance, the health care delivery system, and individual health outcomes. Through the 
development of a complex scenario, this essay explores the long-term socio-technical 
futures of implementing a technology that continuously collects and stores genetic, 
environmental, and social information from life to death of individual participants. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN SOCIETY 
Health and health care are vital components of any society.  Life expectancy, 
infant mortality, universal health coverage, and spending per capita on health care are just 
some of the outcomes used to measure a society’s health and well-being by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  The amount a 
country spends on health care per individual does not equate to having the best overall 
health outcomes compared to other countries (OECD, 2017).  Many social factors 
external to the amount spent on health care can influence the health and well-being of a 
society.  These factors are known as the social determinants of health and include stress, 
early life, the social gradient, social exclusion, work, unemployment, social support, 
addiction, food, clean water, education, housing, and transportation (Schroeder, 2007; 
Marmot, 2005).  Gross inequalities in health exists between countries with an extreme 
example being a thirty-four year difference in life expectancy between Japan and Sierra 
Leone (Marmot, 2005).  Even within countries, there are gross inequalities in health 
between the most and least advantaged individuals (Marmoth, 2005).  Within the United 
States, where a person lives (i.e. their zip code), their ethnicity and race, and their class 
have the potential of influencing their life expectancy up to twenty years (Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation, 2019; Marmoth, 2005; McGinnis et. al., 2002). 
Spending for medical treatments within the U.S. has dominated health policy and 
the overall landscape for health and health care, but arguments have been made to shift 
the focus from a health care agenda to a health agenda that targets health promotion and 
the prevention of disease (McGinnis et. al., 2002).  At a population level, domains 
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contributing to early deaths within the U.S. are estimated to be 40% for behavioral 
patterns, 30% for genetic predispositions, 15% for social circumstances, 10% for 
shortfalls in medical care, and 5% for environmental exposures (McGinnis et. al., 2002).  
Figure 1 illustrates the percent estimates of the various domains that influence health 
adapted from McGinnis et. al., (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Impacts of Various Domains on Early Deaths in the U.S. 
 
In 2006, the U.S. spent an estimated $2.1 trillion or 16% of its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) on health care and a little over a decade later in 2017, health expenditures 
for the U.S. were estimated at $3.5 trillion or nearly 18% of GDP (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2018; Poisal et. al., 2007).  In eleven years, the U.S. has managed 
to increase its health care expenditures by $1.4 trillion or 2% GDP.  Although this 
dissertation primarily focuses on genetics, precision medicine, and health care, it is 
important to note that the health of a society is strongly influenced by other factors like 
behavior, social circumstances, and the environment. 
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The first essay uses a lens of public administration to examine health care as a 
public value.  Achieving high value for each patient is a core tenet within the field of 
health care, yet health care remains a divisive issue within the United States due to 
numerous aspects including access and affordability.  The importance of value within 
health care often focuses on the individual patient with less emphasis on health care as a 
public value.  For this paper, public values are “those values providing normative 
consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to society, the state and one 
another…; and (c) the principles on which governments and policies should be based” 
(Bozeman, 2007, p 13).  This research explores different forms of health care systems 
and attempts to understand who believes access to health care is a public value.  Using a 
survey of more than 2,000 U.S. citizens, this study presents statistically significant 
empirical evidence regarding values and other attributes that predict the probability of 
individuals within age-based cohorts identifying access to health care as a public value.  
This study also defines and isolates public value deniers and explores their public values 
beliefs including access to adequate health care.  An analysis is also performed between 
the values that individuals are willing to self-sacrifice compared to those they believe 
ought to be provided by a society for its citizens.  The investigation reveals a stark 
contrast between individual values and public values related to access to adequate health 
care.  A theory of public values dissonance is developed due to the incongruent beliefs 
that individuals possess regarding health care for themselves compared to the right of 
health care for all. 
Using lenses including bioethics and science and technology policy, the second 
essay proposes a menu of policy recommendations for federal regulators to address the 
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lack of uniformity in current state laws concerning genetic information.  The policy 
recommendations consider genetic information as property, privacy protections for re-
identifying de-identified genomic information, the establishment of guidelines for law 
enforcement agencies to access nonforensic database in criminal investigations, and anti-
piracy protections for individuals and their genetic information. 
In 2012, the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
recommended a consistent baseline of state and federal government privacy protections 
for whole genome sequence information.  Federal law does not grant individuals 
exclusive property rights to their genetic information, but five states currently recognize 
genetic information as the property of the individual from whom it came: Alaska, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana. 
This paper seeks to bolster the protections for individuals and their genetic 
information while reducing uncertainty, variability, and inconsistency from state to 
state.  These recommendations are based on historical, ethical, legal, political, and social 
events that involve current laws governing the uses of human body parts, samples, and 
data, including blood, tissues, organs, genes, and genetic information. 
The first policy recommendation calls for property rights to be granted to 
individuals regarding their genetic information.  The second recommendation calls for the 
establishment of statutory law to proscribe the unauthorized acquisition, collection, 
storage, access, analysis, disclosure, surreptitious use, or reproduction of an individual’s 
genetic information.  A third and final recommendation is a privacy rule that (a) prohibits 
the unauthorized re-identification of an individual using their de-identified genetic 
information unless re-identification could lessen or prevent a serious and imminent threat 
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to the health and safety of the individual or others and (b) prohibits the use of nonforensic 
databases for the identification of suspects as part of a criminal investigation unless a 
threshold is met within established national guidelines for relevant and reasonable 
cause.  Violators who infringe these proposed policies should be subject to criminal 
penalties as well as tort liability through civil processes. 
The third and final essay uses lenses of Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
future studies, and scenario planning to explore the future of the human lifespan. The 
enactment of the 21st Centuries Cures Act as a law and the implementation of the 
Precision Medicine Initiative’s million person cohort within the United States illustrates 
the relevance of precision medicine to the construction of future socio-technical systems 
within health care and all of our lives. The socio-technical futures of precision medicine 
has the potential to radicalize the process and governance for collecting, storing, and 
networking information to document and alter the human lifespan. This study explores 
the socio-technical artifacts of the current health care system for documenting both life 
and death to understand the potential for altering the future of insurance, the health care 
delivery system, and individual health outcomes. Through the development of a complex 
scenario, this study will explore the long-term socio-technical futures of implementing a 
technology that continuously collects and stores genetic, environmental, and social 
information from life to death of individual participants. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ESSAY 1: IS HEALTH CARE A PUBLIC VALUE? 
To understand the various forms of health coverage around the world, an 
exploration of the different types of health care delivery systems is necessary.  There are 
four basic models of health care delivery systems around the world despite the existence 
of nearly 200 countries.  In his book, T.R. Reid (2010) documents the four basic models 
of health care systems which are the Beveridge model, the Bismarck model, the National 
Health Insurance model, and the Out-of-Pocket model.  The Beveridge model is named 
after William Beveridge, the designer of Britain’s National Health Service - a service 
where the government is the sole payer of health care (Reid, 2010).  Variations of the 
Beveridge model can be found in Spain, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Great Britain, and 
Cuba (Reid, 2010).  The Bismarck model, named after the Prussian Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck, is an insurance system that is highly regulated by the government, jointly 
funded by employees and employers, mandated to cover everyone, and doesn’t make a 
profit (Reid, 2010).  Germany, Switzerland, Japan, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium 
all have variations of the Bismarck model (Reid, 2010).  The National Health Insurance 
model exists in Canada, Taiwan, and South Korea, and it is a universal insurance 
program funded by every citizen and run by the government (Reid, 2010).  The Out-of-
Pocket model is typically found in underdeveloped and non-industrialized countries 
where patients are expected to pay out-of-pocket due to no insurance or governmental 
plan (Reid, 2010).  The U.S. health care system is considered a mixed system due to it 
being a patchwork of all four systems. 
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The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides 
information regarding health care and health outcomes for 35 member countries as well 
as several other partnering countries. Universal or near-universal health coverage has 
been realized by 82.8% of all OECD countries with the exception of six: Chile, Greece, 
Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and the United States (OECD, 2017).  Health 
coverage is considered universal if the entire population of the country is covered by 95% 
of core health care services (OECD, 2017).  The U.S. is one of the three lowest providers 
of population wide coverage of all OECD countries and currently spends more on health 
per capita and GDP than any other OECD country (OECD, 2017).  The United States 
spent 17.2% of its GPD on health and USD $9,892 for each of its residents in 2016 
(OECD, 2017).  According to the OECD (2017), the level of health spending in the U.S. 
was almost 25% higher than the next biggest spender and two-and-a-half times the 
average level of spending for all OECD countries. Despite the significant spending on 
health, the United States has an infant mortality rate of 5.8 deaths per 1,000 live births as 
compared to the current OECD average of 3.9 deaths per 1,000 live births placing it at 33 
out of 44 countries (OECD, 2017). Additionally, life expectancy within the U.S. has seen 
modest gains as compared to other OECD countries with the U.S. being at 78.8 years of 
age, but it is still below the OECD average of 80.6 years of age (OECD, 2017). Life 
expectancy at birth in the U.S. ranks 28 out of 44 countries (OECD, 2017). 
Tracking health outcomes and assessing universal health coverage of populations 
are two methods for comparing health quality between countries.  Another measure that 
allows comparing various nations is the Gini coefficient.  The Gini coefficient was 
developed by Corrado Gini and serves as a measure of inequality through the calculation 
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of a single number that describes the distribution of wealth or income for a country (Gini, 
1912).  The Gini coefficient can range from zero to 100 with a score of zero indicating 
perfect equality in income distribution and a score of 100 signifying perfect inequality for 
distribution of income (CIA, 2019).  There are currently five OECD countries who have 
Gini coefficients greater than 40 including Chile (47.7), Mexico (43.4), Turkey (41.9), 
the United States (41.5), and Israel (41.4) (CIA, 2019).  Note that three of the five 
countries with Gini coefficients greater than 40 (Chile, Mexico, and the United States) 
were also listed for not having universal health coverage. 
Table 1 provides a summary of all OECD countries including achievement of 
universal health coverage (OECD, 2017), Gini coefficients (CIA, 2019), estimates of 
civilian firearms per 100 persons (Small Arms Survey, 2019), and rate of all gun deaths 
per 100,000 people (Alpers & Wilson, 2013).  Health care and guns will be addressed in 
a later section of the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  9 
Table 1 
Universal Health Care, Gini Coefficients, Estimated Civilian Gun Ownership, and Rate 
of Gun Deaths of OECD Countries 
 
 
Country 
 
Universal 
Health Care 
 
Gini 
Coefficient 
 
Estimate of Civilian 
Firearms per 100 Persons 
 
Rate of All Gun Deaths per 
100,000 people 
     
Australia Yes 34.7 14.5 1.04 
Austria Yes 30.5 30.0 2.90 
Belgium Yes 27.7 12.7 1.24 
Canada Yes 34 34.7 2.13 
Chile No 47.7 12.1 2.98 
Czech Republic Yes 25.9 12.5 1.77 
Denmark Yes 28.2 9.9 1.47 
Estonia Yes 32.7 5.0 1.49 
Finland Yes 27.1 32.4 2.48 
France Yes 32.7 19.6 2.65 
Germany Yes 31.7 19.6 1.01 
Greece No 36.0 17.6 1.71 
Hungary Yes 30.4 10.5 0.81 
Iceland Yes 27.8 31.7 0.30 
Ireland Yes 31.8 7.2 0.96 
Israel Yes 41.4 6.7 1.24 
Italy Yes 35.4 14.4 1.27 
Japan Yes 32.1 0.3 0.02 
Korea Yes 31.6 0.2 0.06 
Latvia Yes 34.2 10.5 1.44 
Luxembourg Yes 33.8 18.9 1.43 
Mexico No 43.4 12.9 10.72 
Netherlands Yes 28.2 2.6 0.46 
New Zealand Yes 36.2 26.3 1.22 
Norway Yes 27.5 28.8 1.22 
Poland No 30.8 2.5 0.24 
Portugal Yes 35.5 21.3 1.43 
Slovakia No 26.5 6.5 1.89 
Slovenia Yes 25.4 15.6 1.97 
Spain Yes 36.2 7.5 0.60 
Sweden Yes 29.2 23.1 1.60 
Switzerland Yes 32.3 27.6 7.40 
Turkey Yes 41.9 16.5 2.36 
United Kingdom Yes 33.2 4.6 0.23 
United States No 41.5 120.5 11.96 
 
PUBLIC VALUES 
Due to the limitations of public interest theory, public values theory gained 
traction and favorability as documented by several scholarly works that trace the 
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immergence and evolution of public values (Beck Jørgensen & Rutgers, 2015; Van der 
wal, Nabatchi, & De Graaf, 2015; Nabatchi, 2012; Bozeman, 2007).  Public interest 
theory began to be dismissed in the 1950’s due to its ambiguity, vagueness, and lack of 
measurability (Bozeman, 2007).  As public values theory emerged as a potential 
replacement for public interest theory, a clear, unambiguous definition for public values 
was necessary. 
 Although the words public value and public values are nearly identical, their 
theories are dissimilar.  The public value framework developed by Mark Moore 
emphasizes public sector management and the value an organization creates for society 
(Moore, 1995).  In contrast, the public values framework created by Barry Bozeman 
emphasizes a normative political framework and defined a society’s public values as 
“those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to 
which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to 
society, the state, and one another; and (c) the principles on which governments and 
policies should be based” (Bozeman, 2007, p. 13).  Several articles comparing and 
contrasting the two frameworks serve to inform scholars of the differing theories 
associated with public value and public values in response to the potential confusion 
caused by the naming similarity (Bozeman & Johnson, 2015; Bryson, Crosby, & 
Bloomberg, 2014; Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). 
 Public values framework, public value mapping, and public values have been 
used to explore various scientific, health care, and medical topics including science 
outcomes (Bozeman, 2003), cancer (Gaughan, 2003), influenza vaccine shortage (Feeney 
& Bozeman, 2007), nanomedicine (Slade, 2011), science policy and evaluation 
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(Bozeman & Sarewitz, 2011; Bozeman & Sarewitz, 2005), and human organ 
transplantation systems (Wang, 2016).  This study seeks to contribute to public values 
research by asking the question – is access to adequate health care a public value?  This 
paper began with a global comparison of OECD countries who have achieved universal 
health coverage (Table 1) and narrows to a national analysis for one of the OECD 
countries who hasn’t achieved universal health coverage – the United State. 
VALUE IN HEALTH CARE 
 Value is defined in various ways depending on the field of study.  This paper 
explores value and public values in the fields of health care and public administration.  
The notion of using public values within health care to set priorities is not a new concept 
(Mullen, 1999; Hadorn, 1991).  Over time, the concept of value within health care has 
evolved to be defined as the amount spent (per dollar) to achieve health outcomes or 
more simply put outcomes relative to costs (Porter & Teisberg, 2006).  After a long 
period of being misunderstood and unmeasured (Porter, 2010), value-driven outcomes 
(Lee et. al., 2016) as well as value-based health care delivery systems and reforms (Porter 
& Lee, 2016; Porter, 2009; Porter, 2008) are finally being realized through experience 
groups (Silverman, 2017), measuring outcomes that matter to patients (Teisberg & 
Wallace, 2015), and improving functional outcomes measures (Wallace & Teisberg, 
2016).  Despite this progress, many individuals still don’t have access to the health 
services they need and risk impoverishment or financial ruin due to seeking health care 
(Dye, Reeder, & Terry, 2013). This is the antithesis of universal health coverage. 
HYPOTHESES 
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 Vaccines, gun violence, reproductive health, and health reform are all important 
public health issues and topics of focus for the American Public Health Association 
(APHA, 2019).  However, the right to health care for all citizens is a contentious topic 
within the United States. Headlines abound, especially during national elections, debating 
health care as a right or a privilege for all citizens.  There are several fiercely debated 
topics within the U.S. involving health care including the type of health care system that 
should exist, the exorbitant amount spent on health care, and poor health outcomes 
despite the vast amounts of money poured into the health care system.  According to the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2018), the national health expenditure for 
the U.S. totaled $3.5 trillion in 2017 which translates to $10,739 for each person and 
nearly 18% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 Although this paper can’t answer if access to adequate health care is a public 
value, it will provide insights into the beliefs of a sampling of U.S. citizens regarding 
access to adequate health care as a public value.  Specifically, this paper will explore five 
age-based cohorts to determine who does and who doesn’t think access to adequate 
health care is a public value.  This paper will also compare and contrast citizens’ beliefs 
about other potential public values including gun ownership, women’s right to terminate 
an unwanted pregnancy, and racial and ethnic diversity and how they relate to access to 
adequate health care. 
HEALTH CARE AND GUNS 
 Guns have been described as a health care issue due to the annual number of 
deaths they cause in accidents, suicides, and homicides (“Guns,” 2014; Miller & 
Hemenway, 2008).  The ability to possess or own a gun varies per country, and the rate of 
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deaths per year by guns depends on the availability and use of guns by each country’s 
citizenry.  As with health care spending, the U.S. leads the OECD countries in annual gun 
deaths and estimated ownership of civilian firearms.  In 2017, U.S. civilians were 
estimated to have 120.5 firearms per 100 persons (Small Arms Survey, 2019).  In 2016, 
the U.S. had approximately 11.96 gun deaths per 100,000 people (Alpers & Wilson, 
2013).  Within the U.S., health care and gun policies are two of the most important issues 
for registered voters.  According to an October 2018 Gallup Midterm Election poll, 
health care was the most important issue for 80% of registered voters (Newport, 2018).  
Gun policy ranked fifth at 72% for the most important issues for midterm voters 
(Newport, 2018).  Gun control advocates within the U.S. have asserted rational public 
health benefits over the past twenty years in an attempt to tighten gun regulations 
(Filindra & Kaplan, 2016). 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who believe that gun ownership is a public value have a 
decreased predicted probability of believing access to adequate health care is a 
public value. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who believe access to adequate health care is a public 
value have a decreased predicted probability of believing gun ownership is a 
public value. 
HEALTH CARE AND ABORTION 
The services and components required for a country to achieve universal health 
coverage can change over time.  The World Health Organization’s executive board 
adopted a resolution in February 2019 that includes access to health care services for 
reproductive and sexual health (Oas, 2019).  Reproductive health as an umbrella 
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terminology can include procedures like abortion.  Inclusion of abortion as part of 
universal health coverage is a polarizing and political topic, but national and global 
advocates for abortion as a requirement for universal health coverage insist it is 
reproductive right (Oas, 2019; Grimaldi, 2017).  Individuals who oppose including 
abortion as a part of universal health coverage may fear that providing access to the 
service may increase abortions, but one study reported a decrease in abortion rates for 
two consecutive years after Massachusetts enacted health care reform legislation which 
included reproductive health (Whelan, 2010) . 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who believe that women’s right to terminate an 
unwanted pregnancy is a public value have an increased predicted probability of 
believing access to adequate health care is a public value. 
HEALTH CARE AND RACE 
The intersection of health care policy preference and racial attitudes can provide 
insight into how opinions about health care can be influenced by racial resentment, 
prejudice, or racism.  Strong opposition from Republicans and conservative Democrats to 
President Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act resulted in claims that racism was the 
actual reason for the opposition (Hanania, 2011).  Several empirical studies sought to 
understand if opinions about health care had been racialized.  One study revealed that 
racial prejudice predicted opposition to Obama’s health care reform policies (Knowles, 
Lowery, & Schaumberg, 2010).  Henderson and Hillygus (2011) found that racial 
attitudes had a large and significant effect on health care attitudes especially for 
individuals possessing the greatest racial resentment.  Tesler (2012) demonstrated that 
racial attitudes played a significant role in influencing health care opinions.  Specifically, 
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the study highlighted how the racial divide regarding health care opinion had increased 
by 20 percentage points over a sixteen-year period from 1993-94 to 2009-10 as well as 
the racialization of health care policies when attributed to former President Obama 
compared to the same policies being attributed to former President Clinton (Tesler, 
2012).  A final study concluded that that attitudes towards universal health care and other 
social welfare policies perceived as providing benefits to racial minorities can be 
predicted by subtle racial prejudice (Shen & LaBouff, 2016). 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals who believe that racial and ethnic diversity is a public  
value have an increased predicted probability of believing access to adequate 
health care is a public value. 
HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES 
The Lancet’s Commission on Essential Medicines Policies summarized the 
importance and interconnectedness of essential medicines including vaccines, health care 
systems, health care, and society in the closing of the executive summary which stated, 
“Without essential medicines, health systems cannot truly help people who fall ill, live 
with chronic disease, and go through various stages of life and death.  Without strong 
health systems, populations cannot realise their right to health” (Wirtz et. al., 2017, p. 
406). 
The 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) (2019) list seventeen goals 
including Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG 3) which is focused on good health and 
well-being.  By 2030, the targets for SDG 3 are slated to be achieved including universal 
health coverage and access to essential medications and vaccinations for all (UN SDG, 
2019).  Even if vaccinations are made available to all, a growing number of individuals 
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are refusing to vaccinate their children.  The decision to vaccinate or refuse vaccinations 
is explored by one study that finds a direct effect between attitudes towards vaccinations 
and an individual’s ideology (Baumgaertner et. al., 2018).  If individuals are supportive 
of health care initiatives, then those individuals may be more likely to support health care 
as a public value.  Individuals who don’t support health care initiatives that are linked to 
public health issues like vaccinations may be more likely to support gun ownership due to 
alignment with personal ideology. 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals who support enacted public values related to health 
care initiatives (i.e. vaccines and not denying health benefits at a faith based 
organization) have an increased predicted probability of supporting health care 
as a public value. 
Hypothesis 6: Individuals who deny enacted public values related to health care 
initiatives (i.e. no vaccines and denial of health benefits at a faith based 
organization) have an increased predicted probability of supporting gun 
ownership as a public value. 
PUBLIC VALUES SACRIFICE 
The public values classification scheme developed by Bozeman (2017) asserts 
that a consensual public value exists when 90% or more of respondents support a 
candidate public value as a public value.  A public value is considered contested when 
more than 50% but less than 90% of respondents support the candidate public value as a 
public value (Bozeman, 2017).  If respondents were asked to sacrifice only one of their 
public values from a list of contested and consensual public values, a potential outcome 
could be that a consensual public value would be the least sacrificed due to reaching 90% 
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consensus or higher among respondents.  Using the same logic, the most sacrificed public 
value among respondents would likely be a contested public value due to not obtaining a 
90% consensus. 
Hypothesis 7: The value that citizens are most willing to self-sacrifice will be a 
contested public value, and the value that citizens are least willing to self-
sacrifice will be a consensual public value. 
METHODS AND DATA 
The 2016 Citizen Values Project surveyed 2,509 U.S. citizens using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing tool.  The use of MTurk for social science and 
health care research is extensive and includes clinical populations (Shapiro et. al., 2013), 
genetic testing (Lillie et. al., 2015), behavioral research (Mason & Suri, 2012), and public 
administration and management scholarship (Stritch et. al., 2017).  In addition, MTurk’s 
reliability (Goodman et. al., 2013), demographic and political attributes of respondents 
(Huff & Tingley, 2015), ability to produce high-quality data (Buhrmester et. al., 2011), 
comparison with social media and in-person testing (Casler, et. al., 2013), use in 
experimental research (Paolacci et. al., 2010; Berinsky et. al., 2012), and the detection of 
nonhuman responses (Dupuis et. al., 2018) have all been topics of scholarly exploration. 
The survey was framed using historical documents and speeches in order to ask 
participants their beliefs about specific public values.  The use of historical documents to 
extract potential public values has been an endorsed method in public values research 
(Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Bozeman, 2002).  For the survey, a public value was 
defined as “the rights and benefits to which all citizens should be entitled and which a 
society should work to provide.”  Fourteen anchored candidate public value statements 
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were presented to participants regarding liberty, freedom of speech, civil rights, public 
participation, freedom of religion, safety and security, gender equity, protection of 
minority interests, economic opportunity, privacy, racial and ethnic diversity, gun 
ownership, access to adequate health care, and women’s rights to terminate a pregnancy.  
Participants were then asked to determine if they believed the candidate public value to 
be a public value.  For this study the dependent variable was the candidate public value 
regarding access to adequate health care.  To frame access to adequate health care as a 
candidate public value, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union address was 
provided to participants: 
“We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis 
of security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or 
creed. Among these: the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to 
achieve and enjoy good health.” 
Participants were then asked if access to adequate health care was a public value.  
Their response choice was coded 0 = No or 1 = Yes. 
Using Bozeman’s (2017) public values classification scheme, consensual public 
values (when 90% or more of the respondents indicated the candidate value as a public 
value) and contested public values (when more than 50% but less than 90% of 
respondents indicated the candidate value as a public value) were identified (Table 2).  
Access to adequate health care as a public value was supported by 2,132 respondents 
(84.97%) making it a contested public value. 
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Table 2 
Consensual and Contested Public Values 
 Considered A Public Value 
Value Yes No 
   
Consensual Public Value   
   
Freedom of Speech 2,447 62 
 (97.53%) (2.47%) 
   
Liberty 2,438 71 
 (97.17%) (2.83%) 
   
Civil Rights 2,408 101 
 (95.97%) (4.03%) 
   
Political Participation 2.354 155 
 (93.82%) (6.18%) 
   
Freedom of Religion 2,330 179 
 (92.87%) (7.13%) 
   
Gender Equality 2,292 217 
 (91.35%) (8.65%) 
   
Safety and Security 2,270 239 
 (90.47%) (9.53%) 
   
Contested Public Value   
   
Protection of Minority Interests 2,161 348 
 (86.13%) (13.87%) 
   
Access to Adequate Health Care 2,132 377 
 (84.97%) (15.03%) 
   
Economic Opportunity 2,132 377 
 (84.97%) (15.03%) 
   
Privacy 2,057 452 
 (81.98%) (18.02%) 
   
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 1,795 714 
 (71.54%) (28.46%) 
   
Gun Ownership 1,601 908 
 (63.81%) (36.19%) 
   
Women’s Prerogative to Terminate an Unwanted Pregnancy 1,564 945 
 (62.34%) (37.66%) 
 
Participants were also asked to self-sacrifice one of the fourteen public values.  
Specifically, the statement said, “Let us assume that you were somehow forced to 
sacrifice just 1 of the 14 values that we’ve provided in order to obtain the others.  Which 
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one would you sacrifice?”  Table 3 provides the results for the public values sacrifice 
exercise. 
Table 3 
Individual Sacrificed Values in Order of Least Sacrificed to Most Sacrificed  
Value Frequency Percentage 
Access to Adequate Health Care 7 0.28% 
Liberty 11 0.44% 
Civil Rights 16 0.64% 
Economic Opportunity 39 1.55% 
Safety and Security 49 1.95% 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 60 2.39% 
Privacy 78 3.11% 
Gender Equality 78 3.11% 
Gun Ownership 79 3.15% 
Political Participation 82 3.27% 
Freedom of Speech 146 5.82% 
Protection of Minority Interests 209 8.33% 
Women’s Prerogative to Terminate an Unwanted Pregnancy 607 24.19% 
Freedom of Religion 1,048 41.77% 
Total  2,509 100.0% 
 
Demographic information was also collected including age, income, gender, 
marital status, parental status, educational level, employment status, race, 
Hispanic/Latino/Spanish origin, political affiliation, parents’ education attainment, and 
U.S. born.  Table 4 provides the demographic information and percentages for 
individuals who either supported or denied access to adequate health care as a public 
value where n=2509. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  21 
Table 4 
Demographics for Support and Denial of Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public 
Value 
  
Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value  
(n=2509) 
 Support Deny 
Age   
18-24 264 (10.5%) 43 (1.7%) 
25-34 1013 (40.4%) 175 (7.0%) 
35-44 472 (18.8%) 75 (3.0%) 
45-54 226 (9.0%) 49 (2.0%) 
55-64 125 (5.0%) 24 (1.0%) 
65-74 31 (1.2%) 10 (0.4%) 
75 or older 1 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%) 
   
Income   
Less than $10,000 288 (11.5%) 38 (1.5%) 
$10,000--$19,999 247 (9.8%) 40 (1.6%) 
$20,000--$29,999 299 (11.9%) 56 (2.2%) 
$30,000--$39,999 314 (12.5%) 40 (1.6%) 
$40,000--$49,999 252 (10.0%) 44 (1.8%) 
$50,000--$59,999 208 (8.3%) 39 (1.6%) 
$60,000--$69,999 153 (6.1%) 27 (1.1%) 
$70,000--$79,999 121 (4.8%) 26 (1.0%) 
$80,000--$89,999 70 (2.8%) 16 (0.6%) 
$90,000--$99,999 51 (2.0%) 12 (0.5%) 
$100,000--$149,999 104 (4.1%) 30 (1.2%) 
More than $150,000 25 (1.0%) 9 (0.4%) 
   
Gender   
Male 1026 (40.9%) 223 (8.9%) 
Female 1095 (43.6%) 150 (6.0%) 
Other 2 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
Prefer not to disclose 9 (0.4%) 4 (0.2%) 
   
Marital Status   
Married 871 (34.7%) 166 (6.6%) 
Widowed 19 (0.8%) 3 (0.1%) 
Divorced 157 (6.3%) 23 (0.9%) 
Separated 32 (1.3%) 5 (0.2%) 
Never married 379 (15.1%) 52 (2.1%) 
Single 674 (26.9%) 128 (5.1%) 
   
Parental Status   
No 1237 (49.3%) 211 (8.4%) 
Yes 895 (35.7%) 166 (6.6%) 
   
Employment Status   
Employed full time 1196 (47.7%) 248 (9.9%) 
Employed part time 350 (13.9%) 57 (2.3%) 
Unemployed looking for work 165 (6.6%) 22 (0.9%) 
Unemployed not looking for work 159 (6.3%) 13 (0.5%) 
Retired 44 (1.8%) 8 (0.3%) 
Student 105 (4.2%) 14 (0.6%) 
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 Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value 
(n=2509)   
 Support Deny 
   
Disabled 55 (2.2%) 3 (0.1%) 
Working multiple jobs 58 (2.3%) 12 (0.5%) 
   
Education Attainment   
Less than high school 11 (0.4%) 3 (0.1%) 
High school graduate 207 (8.3%) 33 (1.3%) 
Some college 570 (22.7%) 87 (3.5%) 
2-year degree 232 (9.2%) 40 (1.6%) 
4-year degree 861 (34.3%) 152 (6.1%) 
Professional degree 213 (8.5%) 56 (2.2%) 
Doctorate 38 (1.5%) 6 (0.2%) 
   
Political Affiliation   
Independent 486 (19.4%) 97 (3.9%) 
Apolitical 105 (4.2%) 18 (0.7%) 
Republic (“Weak” or “Strong”) 436 (17.4%) 164 (6.5%) 
     “Weak” Republican 262 (10.4%) 87 (3.5%) 
     “Strong” Republican 174 (6.9%) 77 (3.1%) 
Democrat (“Weak” or “Strong”) 1016 (40.5%) 70 (2.8%) 
     “Weak” Democrat 500 (19.9%) 47 (1.9%) 
     “Strong” Democrat 516 (20.6%) 23 (0.9%) 
Other Party Affiliation 89 (3.5%) 28 (1.1%) 
   
Parents’ Education Attainment   
Neither finished high school 93 (3.7%) 6 (0.2%) 
At least one finished high school 537 (21.4%) 83 (3.3%) 
At least one attended college 422 (16.8%) 80 (3.2%) 
At least one graduated from college 638 (25.4%) 134 (5.3%) 
At least one obtained an advanced degree 417 (16.6%) 71 (2.8%) 
Refuse/Don’t know 25 (1.0%) 3 (0.1%) 
   
Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish Origin   
No 1986 (79.2%) 348 (13.9%) 
Yes 146 (5.8%) 29 (1.2%) 
   
Race   
White 1710 (68.2%) 308 (12.3%) 
Black or African American 172 (6.9%) 26 (1.0%) 
American Indian or Alaska Native 25 (1.0%) 4 (0.2%) 
Asian 168 (6.7%) 27 (1.1%) 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 3 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
Other 54 (2.2%) 12 (0.5%) 
   
US Born   
No 102 (4.1%) 17 (0.7%) 
Yes 2030 (80.9%) 360 (14.3%) 
 
Table 5 compares supporters for access to adequate health care as a public value 
amongst themselves (n=2132).  Table 5 also compares individuals who deny access to 
adequate health care as a public value with other deniers (n=377). 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Percent Distribution between Support and Denial of Access to Adequate 
Health Care as a Public Value 
  
Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value  
(n=2509) 
 
 Support (n = 2132) Deny (n = 377) 
Age   
18-24 264 (12.4%) 43 (11.4%) 
25-34 1013 (47.5%) 175 (46.4%) 
35-44 472 (22.1%) 75 (19.9%) 
45-54 226 (10.6%) 49 (13.0%) 
55-64 125 (5.9%) 24 (6.4%) 
65-74 31 (1.5%) 10 (2.7%) 
75 or older 1 (0.0%) 1 (0.3%) 
   
Income   
Less than $10,000 288 (13.5%) 38 (10.1%) 
$10,000--$19,999 247 (11.6%) 40 (10.6%) 
$20,000--$29,999 299 (14.0%) 56 (14.9%) 
$30,000--$39,999 314 (14.7%) 40 (10.6%) 
$40,000--$49,999 252 (11.8%) 44 (11.7%) 
$50,000--$59,999 208 (9.8%) 39 (10.3%) 
$60,000--$69,999 153 (7.2%) 27 (7.2%) 
$70,000--$79,999 121 (5.7%) 26 (6.9%) 
$80,000--$89,999 70 (3.3%) 16 (4.2%) 
$90,000--$99,999 51 (2.4%) 12 (3.2%) 
$100,000--$149,999 104 (4.9%) 30 (8.0%) 
More than $150,000 25 (1.2%) 9 (2.4%) 
   
Gender   
Male*** 1026 (48.1%) 223 (59.2%) 
Female*** 1095 (51.4%) 150 (39.8%) 
Other 2 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
Prefer not to disclose 9 (0.4%) 4 (1.1%) 
   
Marital Status   
Married 871 (40.9%) 166 (44.0%) 
Widowed 19 (0.9%) 3 (0.8%) 
Divorced 157 (7.4%) 23 (6.1%) 
Separated 32 (1.5%) 5 (1.3%) 
Never married 379 (17.8%) 52 (13.8%) 
Single 674 (31.6%) 128 (34.0%) 
   
Parental Status   
No 1237 (58.0%) 211 (56.0%) 
Yes 895 (42.0%) 166 (44.0%) 
   
Employment Status   
Employed full time*** 1196 (56.1%) 248 (65.8%) 
Employed part time 350 (16.4%) 57 (15.1%) 
Unemployed looking for work 165 (7.7%) 22 (5.8%) 
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 Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value 
(n=2509)   
 Support Deny 
   
Unemployed not looking for work 159 (7.5%) 13 (3.4%) 
Retired 44 (2.1%) 8 (2.1%) 
Student 105 (4.9%) 14 (3.7%) 
Disabled 55 (2.6%) 3 (0.8%) 
Working multiple jobs 58 (2.7%) 12 (3.2%) 
*** > 5% difference 
 
  
 
Table 6 evaluates supporters and deniers of access to adequate health care as a 
public value and their support or denial of other candidate public values.  The results 
compare and contrast consensual and contested public values among supporters and 
deniers of access to adequate health care as a public value.  In contrast to table 2, the 
consensual and contested public values have been reclassified based on Bozeman’s 
(2017) public values classification scheme. 
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Table 6 
Acesss to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value Compared with Consensual and 
Contested Public Values 
  
Support Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value       
(n = 2132) 
   
Consensual Public Values Support Deny 
 
Freedom of Speech 
 
2089 (98.0%) 
 
43 (2.0%) 
Liberty 2086 (97.8%) 46 (2.2%) 
Civil Rights 2072 (97.2%) 60 (2.8%) 
Political Participation 2024 (94.9%) 108 (5.1%) 
Gender Equality 2011 (94.3%) 121 (5.7%) 
Freedom of Religion 1981 (92.9%) 151 (7.1%) 
Safety and Security 1948 (91.4%) 184 (8.6%) 
   
Contested Public Values   
 
Protection of Minority Interests 
 
1897 (89.0%) 
 
235 (11.0%) 
Economic Opportunity 1883 (88.3%) 249 (11.7%) 
Privacy 1796 (84.2%) 336 (15.8%) 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 1634 (76.6%) 498 (23.4%) 
Women’s Right to Terminate an Unwanted Pregnancy 1417 (66.5%) 715 (33.5%) 
Gun Ownership 1310 (61.4%) 822 (38.6%) 
   
   
  
Deny Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value         
(n = 377) 
 
Consensual Public Values Support Deny 
 
Freedom of Speech 
 
358 (95.0%) 
 
19 (5.0%) 
Liberty 352 (93.4%) 25 (6.6%) 
Freedom of Religion 349 (92.6%) 28 (7.4%) 
   
Contested Public Values   
   
Civil Rights 336 (89.1%) 41 (10.9%) 
Political Participation 330 (87.5%) 47 (12.5%) 
Safety and Security 322 (85.4%) 55 (14.6%) 
Gun Ownership 291 (77.2%) 86 (22.8%) 
Gender Equality 281 (74.5%) 96 (25.5%) 
Protection of Minority Interests 264 (70.0%) 113 (30.0%) 
Privacy 261 (69.2%) 116 (30.8%) 
Economic Opportunity 249 (66.0%) 128 (34.0%) 
   
Not A Public Values   
   
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 161 (42.7%) 216 (57.3%) 
Women’s Right to Terminate an Unwanted Pregnancy 147 (39.0%) 230 (61.0%) 
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Table 7 calculates the difference in percentage between contested and consensual 
public values based on support or denial of access to adequate health care as a public 
value.  Consensual and contested public values are classified using the results presented 
in Table 2. 
Table 7 
Acesss to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value with Percent Differences between 
Consensual and Contested Public Values 
  
% Difference for Consensual and Contested Public Values 
Between Supporters and Deniers of  
Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value        
 
 
 
Consensual Public Values  
Freedom of Speech 3.0% 
Liberty 4.4% 
Civil Rights 8.1% 
Political Participation 7.4% 
Gender Equality 19.8% 
Freedom of Religion 0.3% 
Safety and Security 6.0% 
  
Contested Public Values 
Protection of Minority Interests 19.0% 
Economic Opportunity 22.3% 
Privacy 15.0% 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 33.9% 
Women’s Right to Terminate an Unwanted Pregnancy 27.5% 
Gun Ownership                                          - 15.8% 
 
For this study, public value deniers (n=61) were defined as anyone who supported 
seven or less of the value choice vignettes as public values.  Table 8 provides an 
overview of the frequency of support for each public value within the public value denier 
group. 
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Table 8 
Public Values for Public Value Deniers 
Value Supported Percentage 
Freedom of Speech 46 75.4% 
Freedom of Religion 42 68.9% 
Liberty 41 67.2% 
Safety and Security 36 59.0% 
Civil Rights 32 52.5% 
Political Participation 32 52.5% 
Gun Ownership 27 44.3% 
Gender Equality 24 39.3% 
Economic Opportunity 23 37.7% 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 22 36.1% 
Access to Adequate Health Care 20 32.8% 
Protection of Minority Interests 19 31.1% 
Women’s Prerogative to Terminate an Unwanted Pregnancy 16 26.2% 
Privacy 12 19.7% 
n = 61    
 
Table 9 compares and contrasts support and denial of gun ownership as a public 
value with support and denial of access to adequate health care as a public value. 
Table 9 
Support and Denial of Public Values Related to Gun Ownership and Access to Adequate 
Health Care 
 Access to Adequate Health Care as a Public Value 
Support Deny 
G
u
n
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1310 
(52.2%) 
 
 
291 
(11.6%) 
D
en
y
 
 
 
 
822 
(32.8%) 
 
 
 
86 
(3.4%) 
 
Due to the dependent variable being dichotomous, several logistic and probit 
models were generated (Table 10).  Respondents were then categorized into age-based 
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cohorts to increase variance and a probit was performed using robust standard errors 
(Table 11).  The dependent variable was access to adequate health care as a public value, 
and the independent variables were consensual and contested public values.  Various 
controls including income, gender, marital status, parental status, employment, education, 
political affiliation, parent education, U.S. born, and race were included in the model. 
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Table 10 
Logit and Probit Models: Probability That a Respondent Believes Health Care Is a 
Public Value 
 1 2 3 4 
 
5 
Preferred 
Model 
Consensual Public Values      
Freedom of Speech 
 
0.528 
(0.338) 
0.527 
(0.400) 
0.299 
(0.196) 
0.300 
(0.230) 
0.283 
(0.230) 
 
Liberty 
 
      0.904*** 
(0.306) 
 
          
     0.904*** 
(0.338) 
 
            
     0.498*** 
(0.179) 
 
 
   0.498** 
(0.195) 
 
 
     0.489** 
(0.190) 
 
Civil Rights 0.371 
(0.261) 
 
0.371 
(0.294) 
 
0.214 
(0.153) 
 
0.214 
(0.171) 
 
0.142 
(0.167) 
 
Political Participation 0.188 
(0.228) 
 
0.188 
(0.243) 
 
0.110 
(0.131) 
 
0.110 
(0.141) 
 
0.101 
(0.138) 
 
Freedom of Religion    - 0.557** 
(0.250) 
 
- 0.557** 
(0.280) 
 
   - 0.265** 
(0.135) 
 
- 0.265*  
(0.155) 
 
     - 0.256  
(0.158) 
 
Gender Equality       0.855*** 
(0.182) 
 
     0.855*** 
(0.197) 
 
     0.507*** 
(0.107) 
 
     0.507*** 
(0.117) 
 
       0.432*** 
(0.117) 
 
Safety and Security 0.243 
(0.192) 
 
0.243 
(0.199) 
 
0.137 
(0.109) 
 
0.137 
(0.113) 
 
0.158 
(0.113) 
 
Contested Public Values      
Protection of Minority 
Interests 
    0.316** 
(0.160) 
 
  0.316* 
(0.176) 
 
    0.209** 
(0.092) 
 
    0.209** 
(0.102) 
 
        0.205** 
(0.102) 
 
Economic Opportunity       0.877*** 
(0.151) 
 
     0.877*** 
(0.164) 
 
     0.502*** 
(0.087) 
 
     0.502*** 
(0.093) 
 
         0.497*** 
(0.095) 
 
Privacy       0.438*** 
(0.151) 
 
     0.438*** 
(0.156) 
 
     0.247*** 
(0.085) 
 
     0.247*** 
(0.088) 
 
      0.294*** 
(0.090) 
 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity       0.849*** 
(0.134) 
 
     0.849*** 
(0.139) 
 
     0.480*** 
(0.075) 
 
     0.480*** 
(0.077) 
 
      0.470*** 
(0.078) 
 
 Gun Ownership    - 0.639*** 
(0.147) 
 
  - 0.639*** 
(0.147) 
 
   - 0.350*** 
(0.079) 
 
   - 0.350*** 
(0.078) 
 
     - 0.229*** 
(0.082) 
 
Women’s Right to 
Terminate an Unwanted 
Pregnancy 
      0.738*** 
(0.131) 
 
     0.738*** 
(0.136) 
 
     0.402*** 
(0.072) 
 
     0.412*** 
(0.074) 
 
       0.274*** 
(0.078) 
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Opinions 
 
Denial of Health Benefits 
in Faith-Based Org. 
 
--- 
--- 
 
 
--- 
--- 
 
 
--- 
--- 
 
 
--- 
--- 
 
  
      -0.108*** 
  (0.019) 
 
Vaccinations Before Public 
School Enrollment 
--- 
--- 
 
--- 
--- 
 
--- 
--- 
 
--- 
--- 
 
       0.050*** 
  (0.019) 
 
Control Variables      
Age - 0.010 
(0.061) 
 
- 0.010 
(0.064) 
 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
 
-0.002 
(0.035) 
 
0.014 
(0.035) 
 
Income - 0.028 
(0.025) 
 
- 0.028 
(0.025) 
 
- 0.018 
(0.014) 
 
- 0.018 
(0.014) 
 
- 0.019 
(0.014) 
 
Gender   0.232* 
(0.125) 
 
  0.232* 
(0.135) 
 
  0.128* 
(0.069) 
 
  0.128* 
(0.074) 
 
0.119 
(0.074) 
 
Marital Status       - 0.010 
(0.039) 
 
      - 0.010 
(0.039) 
 
     - 0.010 
(0.021) 
 
     - 0.010 
(0.021) 
 
     - 0.014 
(0.021) 
 
Parent 0.067 
(0.171) 
 
0.067 
(0.170) 
 
0.029 
(0.093) 
 
0.028 
(0.091) 
 
0.035 
(0.094) 
 
Employment    0.066* 
(0.039) 
 
 0.066 
(0.040) 
 
0.034* 
(0.021) 
 
0.034 
(0.021) 
 
0.039* 
(0.021) 
 
Education - 0.082 
(0.055) 
- 0.082 
(0.055) 
- 0.042 
(0.030) 
- 0.042 
(0.030) 
- 0.055* 
(0.030) 
 
Political Affiliation 
      
0.087** 
(0.034) 
 
    
  0.087*** 
(0.033) 
 
      
     0.048*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
     0.048*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
    0.039** 
(0.018) 
 
Parent Education   - 0.113** 
(0.057) 
  - 0.113** 
(0.057) 
  - 0.064** 
(0.031) 
  - 0.064** 
(0.031) 
  - 0.056* 
(0.031) 
      
U.S. Born 0.003 
(0.316) 
0.003 
(0.324) 
0.026 
(0.170) 
0.026 
(0.173) 
-0.012 
(0.174) 
 
Race 
 
- 0.093 
(0.192) 
 
 
- 0.093 
(0.194) 
 
 
- 0.052 
(0.105) 
 
 
- 0.052 
(0.104) 
 
 
- 0.061 
(0.108) 
 
White - 0.174 
(0.721) 
 
- 0.174 
(0.712) 
 
- 0.090 
(0.391) 
 
- 0.090 
(0.377) 
 
- 0.129 
(0.388) 
 
Black - 0.057 
(0.589) 
- 0.057 
(0.582) 
- 0.025 
(0.317) 
- 0.025 
(0.307) 
 0.017 
(0.315) 
 
Latino 
 
- 0.179 
(0.249) 
 
- 0.179 
(0.267) 
 
- 0.108 
(0.137) 
 
- 0.108 
(0.143) 
 
- 0.080 
(0.148) 
 
Asian 
 
- 0.032 
(0.195) 
 
- 0.032 
(0.102) 
 
- 0.017 
(0.097) 
 
- 0.017 
(0.046) 
 
- 0.022 
(0.051) 
 
(Constant) 
 
- 1.932* 
(1.095) 
 
- 1.932* 
(1.117) 
 
- 1.173* 
(0.602) 
 
- 1.1173* 
(0.604) 
 
- 0.833 
(0.614) 
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Logit Yes Yes No No No 
Probit No No Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE No Yes No Yes Yes 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.193 0.193 0.197 0.197 0.221 
     ***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .10  
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Table 11 
Probit Models with Robust Standard Errors: Probability That a Respondent Believes 
Health Care Is a Public Value 
  
Age-Based Cohorts 
  
18-24 
 
25-34 
 
35-44 
 
45-54 
 
55 & Older 
Consensual Public Values      
Freedom of Speech 
 
    1.910** 
(0.944) 
0.173 
(0.288) 
    - 0.323 
(0.947) 
0.955 
(0.764) 
    - 3.633*** 
(1.056) 
 
Liberty 
 
0.038 
(0.648) 
 
          
  0.507* 
(0.269) 
 
            
0.818 
(0.688) 
 
 
  1.114* 
(0.657) 
 
 
     - 5.659*** 
(0.949) 
 
Civil Rights     - 0.293 
(0.638) 
 
0.138 
(0.262) 
 
  0.595* 
(0.342) 
 
0.319 
(0.545) 
 
     - 0.298 
(0.674) 
 
Political Participation     - 0.546 
(0.446) 
 
0.025 
(0.209) 
 
0.387 
(0.292) 
 
    - 0.185 
(0.491) 
 
    1.298** 
(0.591) 
 
Freedom of Religion   - 0.990** 
(0.450) 
 
    - 0.181 
(0.229) 
 
    - 0.430 
(0.359) 
 
0.233  
(0.578) 
 
     - 0.421  
(0.694) 
 
Gender Equality   0.765* 
(0.400) 
 
     0.600*** 
(0.181) 
 
0.269 
(0.280) 
 
0.496 
(0.376) 
 
    1.214** 
(0.554) 
 
Safety and Security     0.936** 
(0.406) 
 
0.183 
(0.149) 
 
     0.515** 
(0.247) 
 
    - 0.998 
(0.703) 
 
     - 0.592 
(0.741) 
 
Contested Public Values      
Protection of Minority 
Interests 
      0.886*** 
(0.278) 
 
0.062 
(0.158) 
 
0.270 
(0.202) 
 
0.188 
(0.331) 
 
         0.168 
(0.598) 
 
Economic Opportunity 0.088 
(0.296) 
 
     0.580*** 
(0.139) 
 
0.264 
(0.225) 
 
     0.929*** 
(0.337) 
 
         0.794** 
(0.396) 
 
Privacy 0.444 
(0.318) 
 
0.176 
(0.135) 
 
0.328 
(0.211) 
 
0.109 
(0.306) 
 
0.260 
(0.380) 
 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 0.351 
(0.295) 
 
     0.493*** 
(0.117) 
 
     0.438** 
(0.173) 
 
  0.443* 
(0.255) 
 
     0.866** 
(0.365) 
 
 Gun Ownership     - 0.122 
(0.240) 
 
  - 0.356*** 
(0.114) 
 
   - 0.530*** 
(0.200) 
 
   - 0.834*** 
(0.303) 
 
0.161 
(0.386) 
 
Women’s Right to 
Terminate an Unwanted 
Pregnancy 
  0.477* 
(0.245) 
 
     0.445*** 
(0.110) 
 
0.253 
(0.171) 
 
    0.703** 
(0.279) 
 
       1.051*** 
(0.388) 
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Control Variables 
Income     - 0.003 
(0.039) 
 
    - 0.014 
(0.022) 
 
    - 0.010 
(0.030) 
 
   - 0.169*** 
(0.046) 
 
0.028 
(0.071) 
 
Gender 0.303 
(0.218) 
 
 0.147 
(0.103) 
 
    0.366** 
(0.159) 
 
0.050 
(0.233) 
 
     - 0.193 
(0.336) 
 
Marital Status        0.074 
(0.071) 
 
    - 0.002 
(0.029) 
 
    - 0.004 
(0.043) 
 
   - 0.262*** 
(0.082) 
 
       0.168 
(0.113) 
 
Parent 0.485 
(0.424) 
 
    - 0.013 
(0.140) 
 
    - 0.171 
(0.186) 
 
0.279 
(0.260) 
 
    0.821** 
(0.391) 
 
Employment      -0.012 
(0.054) 
 
  0.067* 
(0.039) 
 
0.045 
(0.059) 
 
0.074 
(0.071) 
 
0.056 
(0.088) 
 
Education     - 0.102 
(0.092) 
    - 0.028 
(0.046) 
    - 0.068 
(0.070) 
0.112 
(0.114) 
     - 0.059 
(0.163) 
 
Political Affiliation 
      
     -0.064 
(0.057) 
 
    
  0.043* 
(0.024) 
 
      
0.030 
(0.047) 
 
 
0.113 
(0.077) 
 
 
       0.232*** 
(0.084) 
 
Parent Education 0.047 
(0.102) 
    - 0.049 
(0.046) 
    - 0.073 
(0.074) 
- 0.188* 
(0.106) 
     - 0.212 
(0.152) 
      
U.S. Born   0.964* 
(0.581) 
0.047 
(0.259) 
    - 0.420 
(0.463) 
0.347 
(0.367) 
     - 0.791 
(0.557) 
 
Race 
 
    - 1.752*** 
(0.239) 
 
 
0.023 
(0.193) 
 
 
- 0.423* 
(0.257) 
 
 
    0.832** 
(0.326) 
 
 
    - 1.859*** 
(0.572) 
 
White     - 8.583*** 
(1.028) 
 
    - 0.051 
(0.823) 
 
    - 1.025 
(0.935) 
 
  1.971* 
(1.038) 
 
- 4.292* 
(2.237) 
 
Black     - 5.753*** 
(0.865) 
    - 0.131 
(0.671) 
    - 0.737 
(0.799) 
1.259 
(0.897) 
     - 3.438* 
(1.809) 
 
Latino 
 
    - 0.439 
(0.301) 
 
    - 0.021 
(0.191) 
 
      0.688 
(0.474) 
 
    - 0.979 
(0.684) 
 
      3.750*** 
(1.111) 
 
Asian 
 
    - 3.557*** 
(0.588) 
 
    - 0.075 
(0.389) 
 
0.039 
(0.049) 
 
    - 0.129 
(0.106) 
 
-- 
-- 
 
(Constant) 
 
      6.889*** 
(2.020) 
 
    - 1.406 
(1.112) 
 
0.557 
(1.485) 
 
- 3.690* 
(1.961) 
 
     13.469*** 
(3.523) 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.293 0.191 0.208 0.392 0.534 
n 307 1188 547 275 192 
    ***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .10  
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Table 12 is similar to table 11 with the exception of two additional health care 
opinions related to health benefits and vaccinations being included as independent 
variables. 
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Table 12 
Probit Models with Robust Standard Errors: Probability That a Respondent Believes 
Health Care Is a Public Value with Added Health Opinions 
  
Age-Based Cohorts 
  
18-24 
 
25-34 
 
35-44 
 
45-54 
 
55 & Older 
Consensual Public Values      
Freedom of Speech 
 
    1.974** 
(0.863) 
0.161 
(0.281) 
    - 0.311 
(0.988) 
0.785 
(0.811) 
    - 3.546*** 
(1.177) 
 
Liberty 
 
0.043 
(0.588) 
 
          
  0.485* 
(0.267) 
 
            
0.804 
(0.689) 
 
 
  1.252* 
(0.700) 
 
 
     - 7.531*** 
(1.331) 
 
Civil Rights     - 0.593 
(0.691) 
 
0.049 
(0.246) 
 
0.543 
(0.359) 
 
0.507 
(0.554) 
 
     - 0.559 
(0.724) 
 
Political Participation     - 0.645 
(0.434) 
 
    - 0.022 
(0.198) 
 
0.453 
(0.303) 
 
    - 0.215 
(0.467) 
 
    1.878*** 
(0.674) 
 
Freedom of Religion   - 0.953** 
(0.402) 
 
    - 0.159 
(0.236) 
 
    - 0.422 
(0.368) 
 
0.124  
(0.556) 
 
     - 0.846  
(0.808) 
 
Gender Equality   0.720* 
(0.422) 
 
     0.521*** 
(0.181) 
 
0.260 
(0.290) 
 
0.365 
(0.353) 
 
  1.017* 
(0.612) 
 
Safety and Security     0.995** 
(0.403) 
 
0.199 
(0.152) 
 
     0.490** 
(0.249) 
 
    - 0.757 
(0.731) 
 
     - 0.407 
(0.801) 
 
Contested Public Values      
Protection of Minority 
Interests 
      0.925*** 
(0.293) 
 
0.056 
(0.157) 
 
0.210 
(0.210) 
 
0.179 
(0.349) 
 
         0.694 
(0.647) 
 
Economic Opportunity 0.098 
(0.328) 
 
     0.601*** 
(0.140) 
 
0.260 
(0.224) 
 
    0.885** 
(0.360) 
 
         1.168*** 
(0.437) 
 
Privacy 0.552 
(0.311) 
 
0.197 
(0.138) 
 
0.361* 
(0.210) 
 
0.169 
(0.338) 
 
0.393 
(0.437) 
 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity 0.328 
(0.284) 
 
     0.475*** 
(0.118) 
 
     0.453** 
(0.182) 
 
0.401 
(0.269) 
 
0.673 
(0.449) 
 
 Gun Ownership     - 0.030 
(0.244) 
 
  - 0.265** 
(0.118) 
 
    - 0.381* 
(0.221) 
 
    - 0.642* 
(0.335) 
 
  0.941* 
(0.482) 
 
Women’s Right to 
Terminate an Unwanted 
Pregnancy 
0.351 
(0.255) 
 
     0.315*** 
(0.117) 
 
0.086 
(0.191) 
 
    0.625** 
(0.297) 
 
    0.983** 
(0.442) 
 
  ***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .10  
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Opinions 
 
Denial of Health Benefits 
in Faith-Based Org. 
 
-0.080 
(0.065) 
 
 
    -0.103*** 
(0.028) 
 
 
    - 0.103** 
(0.044) 
 
 
    - 0.114* 
(0.069) 
 
 
    - 0.333*** 
(0.078) 
 
Vaccinations Before Public 
School Enrollment 
0.098 
(0.081) 
 
    0.069** 
(0.027) 
 
0.032 
(0.044) 
 
    - 0.023 
(0.065) 
 
0.013 
(0.101) 
 
Control Variables      
Income        0.002 
(0.038) 
 
    - 0.010 
(0.023) 
 
    - 0.013 
(0.031) 
 
   - 0.153*** 
(0.045) 
 
0.045 
(0.073) 
 
Gender 0.336 
(0.235) 
 
      0.104 
(0.106) 
 
  0.350** 
(0.159) 
 
0.019 
(0.232) 
 
     - 0.185 
(0.369) 
 
Marital Status        0.060 
(0.072) 
 
    - 0.001 
(0.030) 
 
    - 0.009 
(0.042) 
 
   - 0.276*** 
(0.088) 
 
       0.183 
(0.141) 
 
Parent 0.436 
(0.456) 
 
      0.020 
(0.144) 
 
    - 0.187 
(0.187) 
 
0.230 
(0.250) 
 
  0.914* 
(0.510) 
 
Employment      -0.018 
(0.054) 
 
  0.070* 
(0.039) 
 
0.061 
(0.059) 
 
0.078 
(0.076) 
 
0.085 
(0.094) 
 
Education     - 0.129 
(0.089) 
    - 0.050 
(0.046) 
    - 0.073 
(0.071) 
0.111 
(0.117) 
     - 0.075 
(0.158) 
 
Political Affiliation 
      
     -0.082 
(0.057) 
 
    
0.036 
(0.025) 
 
      
      0.030 
(0.048) 
 
 
0.121 
(0.083) 
 
 
   0.216* 
(0.119) 
 
Parent Education 0.019 
(0.111) 
    - 0.036 
(0.046) 
    - 0.074 
(0.075) 
- 0.179* 
(0.104) 
     - 0.168 
(0.169) 
      
U.S. Born 0.764 
(0.615) 
    - 0.019 
(0.259) 
    - 0.327 
(0.477) 
0.422 
(0.381) 
     - 1.593* 
(0.838) 
 
Race 
 
    - 1.825*** 
(0.274) 
 
 
0.006 
(0.196) 
 
 
    - 0.411 
(0.269) 
 
 
    0.757** 
(0.333) 
 
 
 - 1.893** 
(0.760) 
 
White     - 8.867*** 
(1.160) 
 
    - 0.590 
(0..816) 
 
    - 1.059 
(0.970) 
 
1.734 
(1.074) 
 
     - 4.165 
(2.951) 
 
Black     - 5.912*** 
(0.950) 
    - 0.038 
(0.665) 
    - 0.715 
(0.831) 
1.082 
(0.890) 
     - 3.067 
(2.187) 
 
Latino 
 
    - 0.501* 
(0.298) 
 
    - 0.007 
(0.195) 
 
      0.697 
(0.474) 
 
    - 0.930 
(0.743) 
 
      3.586*** 
(1.302) 
 
Asian 
 
    - 3.738*** 
(0.613) 
 
    - 0.030 
(0.391) 
 
      0.021 
(0.051) 
 
    - 0.094 
(0.101) 
 
-- 
-- 
 
(Constant) 
 
      7.655*** 
(2.021) 
 
    - 1.043 
(1.111) 
 
0.747 
(1.529) 
 
    - 3.167 
(1.926) 
 
     15.867*** 
(4.255) 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.312 0.217 0.226 0.405 0.597 
n 307 1188 547 275 192 
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Table 13 replaces the dependent variable of access to adequate health care as a 
public value with gun ownership as a public value.  Access to adequate health care was 
included as an independent variable.  All other independent and control variables used for 
Table 12 were also used for Table 13. 
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Table 13 
Probit Models with Robust Standard Errors: Probability That a Respondent Believes 
Gun Ownership Is a Public Value 
  
Age-Based Cohorts 
  
18-24 
 
25-34 
 
35-44 
 
45-54 
 
55 & Older 
Consensual Public Values      
Freedom of Speech 
 
1.014 
(0.696) 
0.272 
(0.233) 
0.747 
(0.457) 
    1.327** 
(0.666) 
      6.612*** 
(0.595) 
 
Liberty 
 
     - 0.192 
(0.432) 
 
          
0.175 
(0.275) 
 
          
0.532 
(0.594) 
 
 
    1.480** 
(0.640) 
 
 
      2.827*** 
(0.871) 
 
Civil Rights        0.355 
(0.424) 
 
    - 0.469 
(0.287) 
 
    - 0.280 
(0.414) 
 
    - 1.025 
(1.276) 
 
     - 0.087 
(0.582) 
 
Political Participation        0.748** 
(0.328) 
 
  0.312* 
(0.188) 
 
      0.273 
(0.275) 
 
    - 0.685 
(0.648) 
 
     - 0.325 
(0.615) 
 
Freedom of Religion 0.171 
(0.320) 
 
    - 0.006 
(0.161) 
 
    - 0.082 
(0.243) 
 
0.193  
(0.441) 
 
0.776  
(0.705) 
 
Gender Equality     - 0.393 
(0.301) 
 
     - 0.131 
(0.183) 
 
       0.403 
(0.248) 
 
    - 0.458 
(0.519) 
 
     - 0.490 
(0.552) 
 
Safety and Security     - 0.134 
(0.407) 
 
0.092 
(0.135) 
 
0.249 
(0.240) 
 
      0.246 
(0.363) 
 
       0.915*** 
(0.341) 
 
Contested Public Values      
Protection of Minority 
Interests 
  0.441* 
(0.264) 
 
     - 0.048 
(0.139) 
 
       0.148 
(0.202) 
 
0.424 
(0.350) 
 
0.117 
(0.408) 
 
Economic Opportunity 0.332 
(0.269) 
 
0.081 
(0.123) 
 
0.221 
(0.209) 
 
  0.598* 
(0.340) 
 
- 0.567* 
(0.344) 
 
Privacy 0.063 
(0.266) 
 
    0.294** 
(0.116) 
 
  0.326* 
(0.174) 
 
    - 0.195 
(0.237) 
 
       0.388 
(0.297) 
 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity  - 0.518** 
(0.246) 
 
- 0.201* 
(0.104) 
 
   - 0.565*** 
(0.153) 
 
    - 0.165 
(0.206) 
 
     - 0.231 
(0.290) 
 
 Access to Adequate Health    
 Care 
    - 0.016 
(0.267) 
 
  - 0.262** 
(0.132) 
 
    - 0.430* 
(0.255) 
 
    - 0.648* 
(0.354) 
 
       0.436 
(0.379) 
 
Women’s Right to 
Terminate an Unwanted 
Pregnancy 
    - 0.081 
(0.202) 
 
    0.210** 
(0.095) 
 
    0.338** 
(0.145) 
 
    - 0.409* 
(0.211) 
 
     - 0.049 
(0.259) 
 
  ***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .10  
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Opinions 
 
Denial of Health Benefits 
in Faith-Based Org. 
 
      0.194*** 
(0.052) 
 
 
     0.108*** 
(0.023) 
 
 
     0.247*** 
(0.036) 
 
 
    0.230*** 
(0.050) 
 
 
       0.297*** 
(0.076) 
 
Vaccinations Before Public 
School Enrollment 
0.008 
(0.049) 
 
 - 0.054** 
(0.022) 
 
    - 0.050 
(0.034) 
 
    - 0.039 
(0.052) 
 
     - 0.158 
(0.098) 
 
Control Variables      
Income       0.000 
(0.039) 
 
      0.000 
(0.017) 
 
      0.020 
(0.023) 
 
      0.013 
(0.037) 
 
       0.134** 
(0.057) 
 
Gender   - 0.384** 
(0.180) 
 
  - 0.199** 
(0.081) 
 
0.073 
(0.120) 
 
0.193 
(0.189) 
 
0.209 
(0.258) 
 
Marital Status     - 0.111 
(0.072) 
 
    - 0.031 
(0.022) 
 
      0.044 
(0.035) 
 
    - 0.027 
(0.063) 
 
     - 0.042 
(0.098) 
 
Parent 0.019 
(0.354) 
 
     0.300*** 
(0.103) 
 
0.230 
(0.144) 
 
     - 0.178 
(0.247) 
 
         0.225 
(0.322) 
 
Employment     - 0.056 
(0.037) 
 
    - 0.011 
(0.026) 
 
    - 0.047 
(0.036) 
 
      0.018 
(0.055) 
 
     - 0.074 
(0.068) 
 
Education     - 0.016 
(0.080) 
   - 0.108*** 
(0.036) 
   - 0.110** 
(0.052) 
    - 0.014 
(0.069) 
     - 0.206** 
(0.097) 
 
Political Affiliation 
      
    - 0.048 
(0.043) 
 
      
   - 0.067*** 
(0.020) 
 
      
   - 0.091*** 
(0.033) 
 
      
   - 0.125*** 
(0.048) 
 
      
     - 0.093 
(0.067) 
 
Parent Education - 0.157* 
(0.080) 
    - 0.002 
(0.035) 
    - 0.028 
(0.053) 
    - 0.022 
(0.080) 
     - 0.081 
(0.115) 
      
U.S. Born 0.663 
(0.619) 
0.274 
(0.205) 
  - 0.692** 
(0.348) 
0.549 
(0.489) 
       0.474 
(1.006) 
 
Race 
 
    - 0.229 
(0.294) 
 
 
    - 0.023 
(0.130) 
 
 
    - 0.296 
(0.210) 
 
 
      0.378 
(0.384) 
 
 
       5.524*** 
(0.732) 
 
White     - 1.150 
(1.368) 
 
    - 0.211 
(0.530) 
 
    - 0.585 
(0.720) 
 
      1.396 
(1.588) 
 
     22.787*** 
(3.306) 
 
Black     - 1.346 
(1.105) 
    - 0.270 
(0.435) 
    - 0.437 
(0.585) 
      1.025 
(1.274) 
     17.279*** 
(2.671) 
 
Latino 
 
    - 0.213 
(0.273) 
 
   - 0.396*** 
(0.142) 
 
      0.761** 
(0.376) 
 
    - 1.174** 
(0.541) 
 
       0.038 
(0.992) 
 
Asian 
 
    - 0.171 
(0.626) 
 
    - 0.366 
(0.256) 
 
     0.152*** 
(0.056) 
 
    - 0.470 
(0.848) 
 
-- 
-- 
 
(Constant) 
 
0.890 
(2.196) 
 
      1.141 
(0.842) 
 
0.283 
(1.244) 
 
    - 2.599 
(2.547) 
 
   - 37.661*** 
(3.563) 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.171 0.104 0.176 0.255 0.354 
n 307 1188 547 275 192 
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MODELS AND RESULTS 
Of the 2,509 survey respondents, 1,686 identified either strongly or weakly with 
the Republican or Democratic party (Table 4).  For those who identified as Democrat or 
Republican, a total of 1,452 (57.9%) supported access to adequate health care as a public 
value compared to 234 (9.3%) who denied it as a public value when comparing between 
all respondents.  Solely among the 1,686 who identified as Republican and Democrat, 
86.1% supported and 13.9% denied access to adequate health care as a public value. 
600 individuals identified as strong or weak Republicans for approximately 
23.9% of the respondent pool.  Of the 600 Republicans compared to the total surveyed 
population, 436 (17.4%) supported access to adequate health care as a public value while 
164 (6.5%) denied it as a public value.  Solely among the 600 who identified as 
Republicans, 72.7% supported access to adequate health care as a public value compared 
to 27.3% who denied it as a public value. 
Of all the respondents, 1,086 individuals identified as strong or weak Democrats 
making up approximately 43.3% of the population.  Compared to the total surveyed 
population, 1,016 (40.5%) of the 1,086 Democrats supported access to adequate health 
care as a public value in contrast to the 70 Democrats (2.8%) who denied it as a public 
value.  When comparing between the 1,086 Democrats, approximately 93.6% supported 
and 6.4% denied access to adequate health care as a public value. 
A representative survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 60% of 
American’s believe that health care coverage should be the responsibility of the 
government (Bialik, 2017).  For all Republicans/leaning Republicans, 10% believed in a 
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single national government program, 20% believed in a mix of government and private 
programs, 56% didn’t believe the government to be responsible but thought 
Medicare/Medicaid should continue, and 10% indicated there should be no government 
involvement of any kind (Bialik, 2017).  Among all Democrats/leaning Democrats, 43% 
supported a single national government program, 38% believed in a mix of government 
and private programs, 12% thought Medicaid/Medicare should continue but the 
government is not responsible for health care coverage, and 0% indicated no government 
involvement at all (Bialik, 2017). 
When comparing the Pew Research Center results (Bialik, 2017) to the 2016 
Citizen Values Project, more Democrat and Republican respondents appear to support 
access to adequate health care as a public value (86.1%) to the belief that the government 
should be responsible for providing health coverage (60%).  Although the 2016 Citizen 
Values Project is not a representative survey and is skewed towards Democrats, the 
framing of health care coverage (access to adequate vs. government is responsible) may 
explain the 26.1% differential regarding health care as a public value and government 
provided universal health coverage. 
Differences between consensual and contested values can be found among those 
who support and deny access to adequate health care as a public value.  Table 6 indicates 
that the original consensual and contested public values of all respondents are upheld for 
the supporters of access to adequate health care as a public value, but for the deniers of 
access to adequate health care as a public value, only three of the public values are 
consensual, eight are contested, and two (racial and ethnic diversity & women’s right to 
terminate an unwanted pregnancy) aren’t considered public values for this group.  The 
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top public values that had the greatest percentage difference between deniers and 
supporters of access to adequate health care as a public value were all contested public 
values including racial and ethnic diversity (33.9%), women’s right to terminate an 
unwanted pregnancy (27.5%), and economic opportunity (22.3%) (Table 7). 
Individuals who supported seven or less of the value choice vignettes as public 
values were defined as public value deniers.  The most supported public value among the 
61 public value deniers was freedom of speech (75.4%) and the least supported was 
privacy (19.7%) (Table 8).  Access to adequate health care was the fourth least supported 
public value at 32.8%. 
The first two hypotheses pertain to gun ownership and access to adequate health 
care.  Before addressing the hypotheses through quantitative analysis, an overview is 
provided of how all respondents to the 2016 Citizen Values Project categorize into the 
areas of support or denial for both gun ownership and access to adequate health care as a 
public value.  Table 9 provides the number of respondents (n=2,509) and percentages of 
supporters or deniers for gun ownership and access to adequate health care as public 
values.  A majority of respondents (52.2%) supported both gun ownership and access to 
adequate health care as a public value while only 3.4% denied both as public values 
(Table 9).  For the remaining 44.4% who supported one but not the other, 32.8% 
supported access to adequate health care as a public value while denying gun ownership 
as a public value, and 11.6% supported gun ownership as a public value but denied 
access to adequate health care as a public value. 
Table 10 shows the results of multiple logit and probit models.  The probit model 
using robust standard errors with two questions related to opinions involving health care 
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initiatives was selected as the preferred model for this study.  Public values such as 
liberty, gender equity, protection of minority interests, economic opportunity, privacy, 
racial and ethnic diversity, and women’s rights to terminate a pregnancy are all 
significant and positively associated with the public value - access to adequate health 
care.  The public value of gun ownership is significant and negatively associated with the 
public value of access to adequate health care.  There is no significant association 
between access to adequate health care and the public values of freedom of speech, civil 
rights, public participation, freedom of religion, and safety and security.  There is an 
increase in the predicted probability that citizens will support access to adequate health 
care as a public value if they believe that any of the following are also public values: 
liberty, gender equity, protection of minority interests, economic opportunity, privacy, 
racial and ethnic diversity, and women’s rights to terminate a pregnancy.  If gun 
ownership is considered a public value, then there is a decreased predicted probability 
that access to adequate health care will be supported as a public value. 
Within the opinions portion of this research, the predicted probability of citizens 
supporting access to adequate health care as a public value decreases if they favored 
exempting faith-based organizations from providing certain health services required by 
the government.  An increased predicted probability for supporting access to adequate 
health care as a public value was observed for citizens who favored requiring 
vaccinations of children before being allowed to enroll in public schools. 
Using Bozeman’s (2017) citizenship publicness theory and criteria developed for 
consensual and contested public values, supporting access to adequate health care as a 
public value was significantly associated with supporting only two consensual public 
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values (liberty (p < .05) and gender equity (p < .01)).  In contrast, there was a strong and 
significant association (p < .01) between endorsing any of the six contested public values 
as a public value (protection of minority interests, economic opportunity, privacy, racial 
and ethnic diversity, gun ownership, and women’s rights to terminate a pregnancy) and 
supporting access to adequate health care as a public value. 
To increase the variance within the model,  tables 11, 12, and 13 use five age-
based cohorts including 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55 and older.  The results of the 
probit regression models for health care as a public value without the inclusion of 
opinions (see table 11) and with the inclusion of opinions (see table 12) as independent 
variables are provided in the order of the hypotheses.  The probit model results for gun 
ownership as a public value including opinions as independent variables are provided in 
table 13.  Variance inflation factors were run for each model to test for multicollinearity 
resulting in VIF scores below 10 for all independent variables. 
  The results from table 11 and 12 partially support hypothesis 1 – that individuals 
who believe that gun ownership is a public value have a decreased predicted probability 
of believing access to adequate health care is a public value.  The results from table 11 
indicate strong and significant support (p < .01) for hypothesis 2 for three of the age 
groups (25-34, 35-44, and 45-54).  The results from table 12 are mixed indicating 
significant support for ages 25-34 (p < .05) and ages 35-44 and 45-54 (p < .10) while 
those in the age group 55 and older are significant (p < .10) but refute the hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis claimed that individuals who believe access to adequate 
health care is a public value have a decreased predicted probability of believing gun 
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ownership is a public value.  In table 13, the results are supported and significant for ages 
25-34 (p < .05) and ages 35-44 and 45-54 (p < .10). 
Hypothesis 3 stated that individuals who believe that women’s right to terminate 
an unwanted pregnancy is a public value have an increased predicted probability of 
believing access to adequate health care is a public value.  This claim was broadly 
supported with results from table 11 indicating strong and significant support (p < .01) 
for ages 25-34 and 55 and older as well as significant support for ages 45-54 (p < .05) 
and ages 18-24 (p < .10).  The results from table 12 also demonstrate strong and 
significant support (p < .01) for hypothesis 3 for the age group 25-34 as well as 
significant support (p < .05) for ages 45-54 and 55 and older. 
Results from table 11 and 12 indicate partial support for the forth hypothesis – 
individuals who believe that racial and ethnic diversity is a public value have an 
increased predicted probability of believing access to adequate health care is a public 
value.  Table 11 shows support for hypothesis 4 from all age groups with the exception of 
one including 25-34 (p < .01), 35-44 and 55 and older (p < .05), and 45-54 (p < .10).  The 
results from table 12 indicate significant support for the forth hypothesis among the age 
groups 25-34 (p < .01) and 35-44 (p < .05). 
The fifth hypothesis posited that individuals who support enacted public values 
related to health care initiatives (i.e. vaccines and not denying health benefits at a faith 
based organization) have an increased predicted probability of supporting health care as a 
public value.  The results from table 12 partially support hypothesis 5 for age groups 25-
34 and 55 and older (p < .01), 35-44 (p < .05), and 45-54 (p < .10) within the denial of 
health benefits opinion and only ages 25-34 (p < .05) within the vaccination opinion. 
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Hypothesis 6 asserted that individuals who deny enacted public values related to 
health care initiatives (i.e. no vaccines and denial of health benefits at a faith based 
organization) have an increased predicted probability of supporting gun ownership as a 
public value.  The results from table 13 indicate strong and significant support (p < .01) 
for the sixth hypothesis across all five age ranges within the denial of health benefits 
opinion.  Significant support for hypothesis 6 within the vaccination opinion was only 
observed in ages 25-34 (p < .05). 
Respondents were provided a listing of the following fourteen public values and 
asked to sacrifice one of them: liberty, freedom of speech, civil rights, public 
participation, freedom of religion, safety and security, gender equity, protection of 
minority interests, economic opportunity, privacy, racial and ethnic diversity, gun 
ownership, access to adequate health care, and women’s rights to terminate a pregnancy.  
Hypothesis 7 stated that the value that citizens are most willing to self-sacrifice will be a 
contested public value, and the value that citizens are least willing to self-sacrifice will be 
a consensual public value. 
Although access to adequate health care is a contested public value among the 
U.S. citizens surveyed, it was the least self-sacrificed value out of the fourteen public 
values.  Table 3 provides the results for the values sacrifice scenario.  A total of only 
seven citizens (.28% of respondents) selected to sacrifice access to adequate health care.  
More respondents chose to sacrifice their liberty or civil rights compared to those that 
sacrificed access to adequate health care.  Freedom of religion has been identified as a 
consensual public value; however, the results in table 3 spotlight freedom of religion as 
the greatest self-sacrificed value for all surveyed respondents at 41.7% compared to all 
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other contested and consensual public values.  Based on this analysis, hypothesis 7 is 
refuted and not supported since the value that citizens were most willing to self-sacrifice 
was a consensual public value, and the value that they were least willing to self-sacrifice 
was a contested public value.  The following section theorizes why this anomaly may 
have occurred. 
PUBLIC VALUES DISSONANCE 
Within social psychology, when two items of information like behavior, feelings, 
opinions, or ideas don’t align psychologically, they are said to be in a dissonant 
relationship (Festinger, 1962).  Cognitive dissonance is a “theory that centers around the 
idea that if a person knows various things that are not psychologically consistent with one 
another, he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more consistent” (Festinger, 1962, 
p. 10).  In reviewing the results from the values sacrifice scenario, several candidate 
public values are at odds between what individuals value for themselves compared to 
what individuals value for all citizens in their society.  To describe this phenomenon, the 
term public values dissonance was created and can be defined as “when a group of 
citizens highly values a specific individualized right or benefit but does not believe that 
the same right or benefit should be available or provided to all citizens of a society or 
vice versa.”  Access to adequate health care and freedom of religion both serve as 
examples of public values dissonance when comparing self-sacrificed public values to 
consensual and contested public values for society. 
There are many factors that may help explain this anomaly including supply and 
demand, economics, self-interest, and how these values have been framed or incorporated 
into a society including foundational documents, citizen revolt, war, or the creation of 
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new national systems.  For example, a study exploring partisanship, self-interest, and 
racial resentment as it relates to health care opinion in the U.S. found that self-interest 
played a major role in moderating individual opinions about universal health insurance 
(Henderson & Hillygus, 2011).  The study noted that if a Republican was personally 
worried about their own medical expenses, then they were less likely to switch to oppose 
universal health coverage even as other Republicans grew more negative towards 
universal health insurance (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This analysis focuses on health care as a public value and how it relates to other 
potential public values.  The significant and positive relationships between access to 
adequate health care and other contested public values could serve as a springboard for 
future comparative studies of public values on a global scale.  Citizens from countries 
that have universal health coverage may indicate access to adequate health care as a 
consensual public value. Countries with universal health coverage may have access to 
adequate health care embedded in foundational documents or indicated in landmark 
speeches or court decisions like Article 43 of Spain’s constitution which recognizes the 
right to health protection for its citizens (Spanish Const. art. 43). 
There are limitation to this study.  With nearly all social science research 
including this study, omitted variable bias is a threat to the internal validity due to it 
being a non-randomized field study.  Selection bias is also another threat to internal 
validity due to the survey excluding anyone younger than 18.  In addition, selection bias 
towards younger adults (who might be more technologically savvy) or those who have 
access to a computer and the internet is a possibility since MTurk is an internet based 
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survey system that pays respondents to answer surveys.  Another limitation of this study 
is that it only surveyed citizens who reside in the U.S.  Finally, the U.S. health care 
system is not representative for other countries. 
To continue exploring public value sacrificing, a new measure could be explored 
by asking respondents to not only sacrifice one value for themselves but to also sacrifice 
one value for society.  This has the potential to address the self-interest likely resulting 
within the values self-sacrifice exercise.  It would allow for a deeper exploration of the 
consensual and contested public values identified through the anchored candidate public 
value statements.  In conclusion, future research involving access to adequate health care 
should explore at minimum four countries with each representing one of the four various 
health care delivery models: Bismarck, Beveridge, National Health Insurance, and Out-
of-Pocket.  Comparative public values on an international scale may yield new insights 
into the similarities and differences of the public values held by citizens from differing 
cultures and societies.  This type of comparative international research may eventually 
lead to a better understanding of global public values with the potential of creating a 
global public values inventory. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY 2: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POLICYMAKING FOR THE HUMAN BODY: 
GENOMIC PIRACY, PRIVACY, AND PROPERTY 
Do you own your DNA or the genetic information within it?  Within the United 
States, the answer depends on the state in which you reside.  Former President Barack 
Obama weighed in on this debate when discussing the Precision Medicine Initiative when 
he said, “I would like to think that if somebody does a test on me or my genes, that that’s 
mine, but that’s not always how we define these issues” (Davis, 2016).  Debates 
regarding ownership of organs, tissues, blood, and genes are not new and neither are 
concerns related to the protection and ownership of personal genetic information by 
individuals (Daley & Cranley, 2016; Evans, 2016; Karrow, 2016; Kish & Topol, 2015; 
Lash, 2015; Rao, 2007; Annas, 1999; Colonna, 1998; Murray, 1997; Lin, 1996; Annas, 
Glantz, & Roche, 1995; Barrad, 1992; ASHG Ad Hoc Committee on DNA technology, 
1988). 
 An individual’s genome is comprised of DNA which is both a molecule and a 
medium for storage and transmission of genetic information.  Genetic information 
specifies the production of proteins and nucleic acids that affect biology, including the 
propensity to develop diseases.  DNA and the genetic information it contains are unique 
for several reasons.  DNA sequence data can be used as an identifier; can provide insight 
into an individual’s future health; can be used to stigmatize, marginalize, and victimize 
individuals; reveals personal information about an individual and his or her genetic 
inheritance; and can be directly linked to an individual’s parents, children, relatives, and 
ancestors (Annas, 1995). 
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 DNA has been described as a “future diary” (Annas & Elias, 1992), because the 
information within the genetic code describes aspects of an individual’s future health 
(Annas, 1995).  The term “genetic exceptionalism” describes the “claim that genetic 
information is sufficiently different from other kinds of health-related information that it 
deserves special protection or other exceptional measures” (Murray, 1997, p. 61).  In 
many contexts, analysts oppose genetic exceptionalism because genetic information is 
not sufficiently different from other health or ancestry information to warrant special 
treatment (Gostin & Hodge, 1999).  For many purposes, genetic information can be 
treated as similar to other health information.  Genetic exceptionalism is introduced to 
demonstrate a debate that has been occurring for over two decades regarding the 
uniqueness of genetic information while simultaneously preparing readers at the 
conclusion of this study to ask themselves: “Is my DNA sequence more unique than my 
other health-related information” and “should there be specific protections in place for 
my DNA?” 
 “Gene piracy” describes the sometimes but not always surreptitious bio-
prospecting of remote areas and their populations (McGirk, 1998); but what constitutes 
genetic piracy?  Genetic piracy, also known as DNA theft, is a controversial and loaded 
term.  Is genetic piracy only the unauthorized collection or analysis of an individual’s 
genetic information without their expressed consent or can it also describe the 
unauthorized secondary use of an individual’s genetic information?  For the purpose of 
this paper, genetic piracy is the unauthorized collection, secondary use, or analysis of an 
individual’s genetic information without explicit consent.  With the proliferation of new 
technology and DNA testing services, non-consensual genetic testing on ‘stolen’ DNA is 
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more feasible (“Genetic Privacy,” 2009).  Several legal cases explore the nuances of 
genetic piracy. 
 The proposed Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995 set out to 
create uniform rules throughout the U.S. to protect the individual privacy of genetic 
information.  Specifically, the Genetic Privacy Act addressed concerns regarding genetic 
prophecy, genetic discrimination, and the use of an individual’s genetic information to 
divulge information about relatives (Murray, 1997; Annas, Glantz, & Roche, 1995).  A 
proposed 1996 Senate bill, the Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 
1996 attempted to give individuals property rights over their own DNA samples but was 
never enacted into law (Gostin & Hodge, 1999).  State legislatures began enacting their 
own laws to protect individuals’ genetic information due to the lack of comprehensive 
federal legislation (Rothstein, 2008).  An inconsistent patchwork of state laws now exists 
related to genetic information, genetic privacy, and genetic property. 
 The concept of genetic data ownership is complex and evolving.  Many 
individuals assume that their genetic data is their own personal property; however, 
federal law does not grant individuals exclusive property rights to their genetic 
information.  Five states (Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana) currently 
recognize genetic information as the property of the individual from whom it came, and 
four additional states (Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Texas) have 
introduced bills seeking to grant property rights to genetic information (Roberts, 2017). 
GENETIC POLICIES AND LAWS 
GENETIC NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
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The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) are two federal policies that protect citizens 
from genetic discrimination.  GINA was debated by Congress for nearly thirteen years 
before being signed into law in May 2008 (Roberts, 2011).  GINA is often cited as an 
example of proactive policymaking, because it was enacted before genetic testing became 
as common as it has become (Green, Lautenbach, & McGuire, 2015) and before there 
was evidence of widespread genetic discrimination (Roberts, 2010).  Prior to GINA, only 
three federal cases involved genetic discrimination (Roberts, 2010).  During 1998 in 
Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, prospective employees of 
Lawrence Berkley Laboratory were screened for various medical conditions including 
pregnancy, sickle cell trait, and syphilis (Norman-Bloodsaw, 1998; Roberts, 2010).  
Employees filed a discrimination claim that eventually reached the Ninth Circuit 
(Roberts, 2010).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the ADA claim but reversed the TitleVII 
(part of the Civil Rights Act that prohibits employment discrimination) as well as the 
state and federal privacy claims (Norman-Bloodsaw, 1998).  In 1999, the plaintiffs in 
Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory received a settlement (MacLean, 
1999).  In 2002, the Burlington Northern, Santa Fe Railroad Corporation settled with its 
union after workers who had filed Workers Compensation claims for carpal tunnel 
syndrome learned that the Railroad performed unauthorized genetic testing (Hudson, 
2002).  As part of the settlement, Burlington Northern paid 36 employees a total of $2.2 
M and promised to lobby Congress to enact legislation that prevented genetic 
discrimination in the workplace (Girion, 2002; Hudson, 2002).  A third case involved an 
insurance broker employee, Terri Sergeant, who was dismissed from her job due to the 
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cost of the medication to treat her alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency (Roberts, 2010; Clayton, 
2003; Silvers & Stein, 2002).  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
supported her ADA claim and issued a permission-to-sue letter (Silvers & Stein, 2002). 
Between GINA’s enactment in 2008 until 2014, approximately 1,400 genetic 
discrimination claims were submitted to the EEOC (Bowers & Hutcheson, 2016).  Of 
those, approximately 245 claims yielded successful outcomes for the employees totaling, 
$4.48M in damages (Bowers & Hutcheson, 2016).  In 2015, in Lowe v. Atlas Logistics 
Group Retail Services, Atlanta, LLC (2015), two men were awarded damages totaling 
$2.25 M due to their employer violating GINA when the employer illegally requested and 
required both men to provide genetic information via cheek swab to determine the 
employee who was defecating in the company’s warehouse.  Some critics consider GINA 
too narrow, because it fails to address genetic discrimination in long-term care, disability, 
or life insurance (Green, Lautenbach, & McGuire, 2015). 
The ACA was signed into law by then-President Obama on March 23, 2010.  The 
ACA provides protection to citizens by prohibiting health insurers from discriminating 
due to preexisting conditions or onset of an illness (Blumenthal, Abrams, & Nuzum, 
2015).  Discrimination due to the identification of preexisting conditions from genetic 
test results is also prohibited under the ACA (Green, Lautenbach, & McGuire, 2015). 
GENETIC PRIVACY LAWS 
 Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to safeguard information about 
themselves, and the right to privacy is the ability for an individual or group to limit and 
control the disclosure of information about themselves (Moore, 2000).  The importance 
of protecting health privacy within the United States led to the 1996 Health Insurance 
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Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the addition of the 2003 Privacy Rule 
under HIPAA (Rothstein, 2008).  In 2013, HIPAA was modified to include genetic 
information as health information in order to prevent health insurers from using it to set 
premiums, determine benefits, or decide eligibility for health insurance (National Human 
Genome Research Institute, 2017).  Although HIPAA offers a floor of protection at the 
federal level by identifying genetic information as protected health information (Baruch 
& Hudson, 2008), existing federal laws offer only weak protection for genetic privacy 
(Rothstein, 2008). 
 Several proposals for federal genomic privacy laws have been floated in the past.  
The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995 and the Genetic Confidentiality 
and Nondiscrimination Act of 1996 both failed to be enacted as laws (Green, Lautenbach, 
& McGuire, 2015; Everett, 2003).  Due to the lack of comprehensive federal legislation, 
many states began enacting their own legislation to ensure genetic privacy and prevent 
genetic discrimination (Everett, 2003; Annas, Glantz, & Roche, 1995; Rothenberg, 1995).  
Since the proposed federal genomic privacy laws failed and most “practice of medicine” 
issues are governed at the state level, genomic privacy became a state matter. 
 State laws concerning genetic privacy are disparate.  Some states, e.g. Alabama, 
have no state law.  Five states (Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana) grant 
property rights to the individual being tested (National Human Genome Research 
Institute, 2018; Ray, 2017; Gutmann et. al., 2012).  Legislative bills have been introduced 
in four states (Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Texas) to grant property 
rights to an individual for their genetic information (Roberts, 2017).  Other states, e.g. 
Arizona, prevent genetic discrimination for life and disability insurance (A.R.S. § 20-
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448).  Muddled state laws led President Obama’s Presidential Commission for the Study 
of Bioethical Issues to recommend a consistent baseline of privacy protections at the state 
and federal government levels for whole genome sequence information (Gutmann et. al., 
2012).  Present-day genetic privacy concerns echo sentiments from over two decades ago 
that “current legal safeguards are inadequate, fragmented, and inconsistent, and contain 
major gaps in coverage” (Gostin, 1995, p. 324). 
VARIATIONS IN STATE PRACTICES 
In other legal domains, incongruent policies among states have been addressed by 
enacting relatively consistent state laws, based on model statutes.  The U.S. President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, Biomedical, and Behavioral 
Research (1981) produced a report that proposed a Uniform Determination of Death Act 
(UDDA).  Some states lacked statutes for death and those with statutes had different 
definitions and provisions that confounded the legal determination of death (Abram, 
1981).  This became important when organ transplantation and other advances in medical 
technology made the determination of death a practical problems with real consequences 
for both donors and for those awaiting organs for transplantation.  How does one 
determine biological death or when is it legal to extract a donated liver, cornea, or 
kidney? (Abram, 1981).  A uniform law for all states on the determination of death was 
proposed by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1980 (Abram, 1981).  A model statute 
was adopted by most states and territories, bringing more consistency in how death was 
determined throughout the U.S. (Abram, 1981).  As of 2018, the Uniform Law 
Commission (2018) identified fourteen states that had not yet adopted the UDDA as state 
law.  This example illustrates how the uniform state laws approach does not ensure a 
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completely consistent national policy, because states are allowed to reject, modify, or 
accept and enact the recommended uniform law.  The model statute approach does, 
however, enable progress toward consistency among jurisdictions. 
The U.S. medicolegal death investigation system is an example of disparate state 
practices that might benefit from national standards.  Some states have medical 
examiners, who are usually trained medical professionals; other states have only 
coroners, who are typically elected officials, or a mixture of both coroners and medical 
examiners (National Research Council, 2009).  The National Research Council (2009) 
recommended the creation of state medical examiner systems to replace and eliminate 
existing coroner systems. 
Federal law prohibiting the sale of human organs is another example of federal 
policy imposing consistency and reducing uncertainty.  In 1983, Dr. H. Barry Jacobs 
established a company in Virginia to procure and sell kidneys from healthy individuals 
(Denise, 1985).  The estimated cost for a single kidney purchased through an organ 
broker was up to $10,000 (Rohter, 2004).  Virginia quickly enacted legislation to prevent 
the selling of human organs, and several other states followed suit (Denise, 1985).  On 
October 19, 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act (PL 98-507) was signed into law.  
It included a ban on the sale of human organs (Mueller, 1988; National Organ Transplant 
Act, 1984).  The radical threat of human organ commercialization led Congress to 
prohibit the commodification of human organs (Mueller, 1988). 
Federal laws like HIPAA can be used to set a floor at the national level with states 
having the ability to raise the ceiling to provide additional protections.  The three 
examples of the uniform determination of death, the medicolegal death investigation 
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system, and the prohibition on the sale of human organs are models for how uniformity 
can be imposed through the recommendation and implementations of model statutes, 
uniform federal standards, and federal laws. 
DNA AND GENETIC INFORMATION AS PROPERTY 
 State legislative approaches involving genetic information began in the 1970’s 
due to concerns about genetic discrimination.  During the 1970’s, North Carolina and 
Florida enacted legislation to prevent health insurance discrimination related to sickle cell 
trait or hemoglobin C trait (Rothenberg, 1995).  Concerns about the use of genetic 
information in underwriting insurance led several additional states to implement 
statewide policies involving genetic information as property during the 1990’s 
(Rothenberg, 1995).  As federal bills, such as the Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination 
Act of 1995 and the Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1996 failed to 
become law, state laws defining genetic information as property were passed by five 
states from 1990-2004 with an additional four states introducing similar legislation from 
2012-2017 (Roberts, 2017). Currently, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana 
grant property rights to the individual being tested (National Human Genome Research 
Institute, 2018).  Table 14 summarizes those state statutes. 
Table 14 
State Laws Conferring Property Rights to Individuals and Their Genetic Information 
State Year State Statute Defined property right Acts covered and 
penalties 
Alaska 2004 AS 
§18.13.010 
– 18.13.030 
DNA samples and the 
results of DNA 
analysis are the 
exclusive property of 
A person may bring a 
civil action against a 
person who collects a 
DNA sample from the 
person, performs a 
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the person sampled or 
analyzed. 
DNA analysis on a 
sample, retains a 
DNA sample or the 
results of a DNA 
analysis, or discloses 
the results of a DNA 
analysis in violation 
of this chapter. In 
addition to the actual 
damages suffered by 
the person, a person 
violating this chapter 
shall be liable to the 
person for damages in 
the amount of $5,000 
or, if the violation 
resulted in profit or 
monetary gain to the 
violator, $100,000. 
 
Unlawful DNA 
collection, analysis, 
retention, or 
disclosure is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Colorado 1994 CRS §10-3-
1104.7 
Genetic information is 
the unique property of 
the individual to whom 
the information 
pertains. 
 
Release of genetic 
information that 
identifies the person 
tested for purposes 
other than diagnosis, 
treatment and therapy 
requires specific 
written consent. 
Exemptions under the 
law include some uses 
by research facilities. 
Any individual who is 
injured by the 
violation of an entity 
may seek the 
following remedies: 
 
The greater of: 
 
(I) Actual damages 
suffered by the 
individual.   
 
(II) $10.000 
 
Attorney fees and 
costs of action may 
also be recovered by 
the prevailing party. 
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Florida 1992 FS §760.40 DNA analysis may be 
performed only with 
the informed consent of 
the person to be tested, 
and the results of such 
DNA analysis, whether 
held by a public or 
private entity, are the 
exclusive property of 
the person tested, are 
confidential, and may 
not be disclosed 
without the consent of 
the person tested. 
A person who violates 
paragraph (a) is guilty 
of a misdemeanor of 
the first degree, 
punishable as 
provided in s. 775.082 
or s. 775.083. 
Georgia 1995 OCGA 
§§33-54-1 
Genetic information is 
the unique property of 
the individual tested. 
The use and 
availability of 
information 
concerning an 
individual obtained 
through the use of 
genetic testing 
techniques may be 
subject to abuses if 
disclosed to 
unauthorized third 
parties without the 
willing consent of the 
individual tested. 
 
Penalties include 
unfair trade practice 
and subjected to the 
“Fair Business 
Practices Act of 
1975”. 
 
Actual damages 
suffered by the 
individual.   
 
Attorney fees and 
costs of action may 
also be recovered by 
the prevailing party. 
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Louisiana 1997 LA Rev Stat 
§ 22:1023 
 
(1) An insured's or 
enrollee's genetic 
information is the 
property of the insured 
or enrollee. No person 
shall retain an insured's 
or enrollee's genetic 
information without 
first obtaining 
authorization from the 
insured, enrollee, or 
their representative. 
(2) Any person who 
either: 
(a) Through a request, 
the use of persuasion, 
under threat, or with a 
promise of reward, 
willfully induces 
another to collect, store, 
or analyze a DNA 
sample. 
(b) Willfully collects, 
stores, or analyzes a 
DNA sample in 
violation of this 
Section, or willfully 
discloses genetic 
information in violation 
of this Section, shall be 
liable to the individual 
for each such violation. 
 (1i) Actual damages 
sustained as a result 
of the collection, 
storage, analysis, or 
disclosure, or 
$50,000, whichever is 
greater. 
(1ii) Treble damages, 
in any case where 
such a violation 
resulted in profit or 
monetary gain. 
(1iii) Attorney fees 
and costs of action 
may also be recovered 
by the prevailing 
party. 
 (2i) Any actual 
damages sustained as 
a result of the 
collection, analysis, 
or disclosure, or 
$100,000, whichever 
is greater. 
(2ii) Attorney fees 
and costs of action 
may also be recovered 
by the prevailing 
party 
 
THE HUMAN BODY AS PROPERTY 
 
 A tissue sample can be defined as a material that serves as a source of DNA 
including body fluids, blood, tissues, and organs (Clayton et. al., 1995).   These types of 
specimens haven’t always been conceptualized by the public as sources of DNA which 
could be used for biomedical research without their knowledge or permission.  In fact, the 
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admittedly incomplete case law about biospecimens has awarded property rights to 
academic institutions or medical centers that house them. 
 Several ethical and legal cases address the human body as property and can be 
categorized into two types of scenarios: unauthorized secondary use or unauthorized 
collection or sharing of an individual’s genetic information.  Cases that reside in the 
unauthorized secondary use category include Henrietta Lacks, Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, 
Inc., Washington University v. Catalona, and Tilousi v. Arizona State University.  Two 
ongoing and unresolved cases (Cole v. Gene by Gene Ltd. and Peerenboom v. Perlmutter) 
comprise the other scenario of unauthorized collection or sharing of an individual’s 
genetic information. These cases demonstrate how research institutions and legal systems 
have shaped the interpretation and understanding of property rights concerning the 
human body. 
 A rich history of cases and decisions regarding unauthorized secondary use exists.  
One of the most publicized cases involves Henrietta Lacks, her family, and Johns 
Hopkins University.  In 1951, in an era before the doctrine of “informed consent” was 
fully integrated into research practices, Johns Hopkins University acquired and used 
cervical cancer cells from Henrietta Lacks to create the first immortal cell line known as 
the HeLa cell line (Skloot, 2010).  Lacks was not told about those uses of her cells, and 
her family learned about it only when re-contacted years later (Skloot, 2010).  HeLa cells 
became essential tools in a multi-million dollar industry.  Although neither Lacks nor her 
family received any compensation (Skloot, 2010), Johns Hopkins University recently 
announced that a building will be named in honor of Henrietta Lacks, and two members 
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of the Lacks family have sat on a National Institutes of Health (NIH) panel for the past 
five years to review applications requesting access to the genomic information found in 
HeLa cells (Brown, 2018).  The extraordinary case of Henrietta Lacks has ignited public 
debate and raised awareness for the need to develop robust policies concerning informed 
consent and biospecimens (Beskow, 2016). 
 Moore v. Regents of the University of California is another case based on a cell 
line derived from removal of cancerous tissue.  John Moore underwent treatment for 
hairy-cell leukemia and eventual removal of his spleen at the University of California at 
Los Angeles Medical Center (Moore, 1990).  David Golde and other UCLA researchers 
created and patented a cell line known as the Mo cell line from Moore’s spleen cells and 
sold the cell line to Genetics Institute for $330,000.00 and 75,000 shares of stock 
(Drabiak-Syed, 2010; Moore, 1990).  They also informed Moore that his blood could 
potentially be sold to researchers for $10,000.00 per liter (Truog, Kesselheim, & Joffe, 
2012).  The case progressed to the California Supreme Court which ruled that Moore had 
no property rights over his extracted cells or the medical discoveries developed using his 
cells (Contreras, 2016; Rao, 2007; Moore, 1990).  However, the court determined that 
Moore’s physician failed to obtain informed consent and breached his fiduciary duty to 
Moore as a patient (Contreras, 2016; Rao, 2007; Moore, 1990). 
 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc. is another 
property case concerning the use of patented genetic diagnostics for Canavan Disease.  
The Greenbergs were Chicago parents who had children with Canavan disease 
(Greenberg, 2003).  They formed a Canavan disease registry and database and joined 
with collaborating institutions to enable the study of this debilitating disease of childhood 
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(Greenberg, 2003).  The Greenbergs also enticed Dr. Reuben Matalon to conduct 
research on Canavan disease, using the samples and patient network they provided 
(Greenberg, 2003).  Through his research, Dr. Matalon discovered and isolated the gene 
mutated in Canavan disease (Greenberg, 2003).  Without telling the family or other 
collaborators, he patented the discovery and assigned rights to his research institution, 
Miami Children’s Hospital (Colaianni et. al., 2010; Greenberg, 2003).  Once the patent 
was awarded, Miami Children’s Hospital hired an inexperienced licensing agency to 
pursue an aggressive campaign of restrictive licensing practices which imposed 
diagnostic limitations, including on the very organizations that had enabled the discovery 
(Colaianni et. al., 2010).  This caused mistrust, frustration, and anger among patients and 
advocates who helped with the initial discovery (Colaianni et. al., 2010).  Litigation 
ensued and eventually led to a 2003 settlement which was sealed (Colaianni et. al., 2010; 
Greenberg, 2003).  The litigation did not challenge the patent directly, but rather alleged 
breach of informed consent, misappropriation of biological materials, conversion, and 
unjust enrichment by Miami Children’s Hospital at the expense of its collaborators.  
While the settlement remains sealed, the public statement accompanying the settlement 
indicates that it constrains the hospital’s licensing framework, especially for nonprofit 
testing services such as those involved in discovering the Canavan-associated gene, and 
permits medical research without a license (Colaianni et. al., 2010; Greenberg, 2003). 
 The next case involves Dr. Willliam Catalona who conducted prostate cancer 
research that involved collecting thousands of patient samples.  The prostate cancer 
tumor samples were stored in the Biorepository of Washington University in St. Louis 
(Washington University, 2007).  Dr. Catalona eventually left Washington University and 
  65 
encouraged his patients and those who had contributed to the Biorepository to provide 
permission to transfer samples to his new employer, Northwestern University 
(Washington University, 2007).  In Washington University v. Catalona, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, Eighth Circuit, held that the Washington University owned the biological 
samples housed in their Biorepository because those were the terms of the initial 
donation, and that the patients as well as Dr. Catalona were not authorized to transfer 
property rights from Washington University to another institution (Washington 
University, 2007; Rao, 2007). 
 In the 1990s, a group of researchers led by Therese Ann Markow at Arizona State 
University (ASU) collected DNA samples from the Havasupai Tribe in order to study 
diabetes; however, unbeknownst to the tribe, the DNA samples were distributed to 
various researchers and used for purposes other than diabetes research (Reardon & 
TallBear, 2012; Garrison, 2013).  The uses were discovered only because a member of 
the tribe, Carletta Tilousi, was invited to Daniel Garrigan’s dissertation defense where 
research findings using the Havasupai blood samples were presented (Drabiak-Syed, 
2010).  The secondary use of Havasupai DNA samples included studies of inbreeding 
(Markow & Martin, 1993) and schizophrenia (Markow et. al., 1993).  Other studies 
focused on migration patterns in human populations, the topic of the graduate student’s 
dissertation, which challenged the tribal origin story (Dalton, 2004).  Once the Havasupai 
learned of these unauthorized uses of their samples, the tribe and ASU commissioned 
Stephen Hart, an attorney, to investigate the incident (Drabiak-Syed, 2010).  The Hart 
report documented how the scientists acted as if they had property rights over the 
Havasupai’s blood once it was collected (Reardon & TallBear, 2012; Hart & Sobraske, 
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2003).  In Tilousi v. Arizona State University (2005), the tribe filed a lawsuit against ASU 
and the Arizona Board of Regents.  The case ultimately settled with the Board of Regents 
agreeing to return all of the blood samples to the Havasupai, to provide other forms of 
assistance to the tribe including scholarships, and to pay 41 tribal members a total of 
$700,000.00 (Garrison, 2013; Reardon & TallBear, 2012; Harmon, 2010). 
 The term “genetic piracy” was used to describe the actions of the researchers and 
institutions who used the samples without permission from the Havasupai tribe (Allen, 
2010).  The uses beyond the initial informed consent for diabetes research bred distrust 
and long-term negative consequences for the Havasupai, for research, for the researchers, 
and for the research institutions involved (Pacheco et. al., 2013; Couzin-Frankel, 2010).  
The case is widely known, and often cited as “group harm” and breach of investigator 
responsibility to participants in research.  ASU was held accountable for violating the 
rights of research participants when fully transparent informed consent practices were 
disregarded. 
 Although these cases are not precedential, a theme emerges indicating that 
property interests for genetic data do not exist for individuals who contribute their DNA 
or whose DNA is discarded (Roberts, 2017).  Instead, decisions about property rights of 
the human body have favored the academic institutions or medical centers that collect, 
store, develop, research, and patent discoveries from biospecimens obtained from 
patients.  The denial of individual property rights for donated or surgically extracted 
biospecimens has been supported and upheld by federal courts, but a recent movement to 
redefine data ownership seeks to empower individuals, limit exploitation, create a market 
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for health information, protect family members, and better the common good of society 
(Contreras, 2016). 
 Two current cases involve unauthorized collection or sharing of an individual’s 
genetic information, and they have the potential to shape the landscape of property and 
privacy rights involving individual genomic information.  Both cases involve states that 
have granted property rights to individuals for their genomic information.  In Cole v. 
Gene by Gene Ltd. (2018, 2017), Michael Cole sued Gene by Gene Ltd., which is the 
parent company of Family Tree DNA, for violating Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act by 
publishing his results without his consent (Graf, 2017).  After receiving a lot of email 
spam, Cole searched for his email address on the internet and found his genetic test 
results were published and available to the public (Cole, 2017; Roberts, 2017). A federal 
judge denied Gene by Gene’s motion for summary judgement which claimed that 
Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act is unconstitutional (Graf, 2017).  In August 2018, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
to deny class action certification (Cole, 2018).  The case now returns to the district court 
and is still pending (Cole, 2018). 
 Peerenboom v. Perlmutter involves the theft of DNA during a lawsuit deposition 
in the state of Florida (Angrist, 2018).  Florida grants exclusive property rights of DNA 
results to the person whose DNA was analyzed (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.40(2)(a)) (Genetic 
testing, 1992).  A neighborhood dispute between Isaac and Laura Perlmutter and Harold 
Peerenboom escalated to include a hate mail campaign about Harold Peerenboom 
(Peerenboom, 2017).  In an attempt to prove that the Perlmutters were behind the hate 
mail campaign, Peerenboom conspired with his attorney, William Douberley, to collect 
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the Perlmutters’ DNA from objects they touched during the deposition including a water 
bottle and specially designed DNA binding paper (Peerenboom, 2017).  The Perlmutters 
sued Peerenboom, Douberly, and the lab that processed their DNA claiming conversion, 
because their DNA was collected surreptitiously and fraudulently (Angrist, 2018; 
Peerenboom, 2017).  The case of Peerenboom v. Perlmutter is pending and will be 
another step in determining the implications of state laws that create an individual 
property right in genetic information. 
THE VALUE OF MATERIALS FROM THE HUMAN BODY 
 How much is material from the human body worth?  The process of 
commodifying the body and the construction of DNA as property is highly contested 
(Everett, 2003).  Determinations of the value of materials from the human body can be 
categorized into three subtypes: recompense for harm, amount estimated or paid for 
samples or access to samples, and proposed or imposed civil penalties for violating a law. 
 The monetary value of either settlements or damages awarded is listed in the 
aforementioned cases regarding recompense for harm.  In addition to those cases, several 
other examples demonstrate the growing marketization and monetization of genetic 
information.  At the 10th International Congress of Human Genetics in Vienna, Austria, 
Bear (2001) suggested that research subjects be compensated for access to their DNA for 
at least $50,000.00, royalties from any profits, or a combination of the two.  Genentech 
recently reached a $60 M deal with 23andMe, a direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing 
company, to generate whole genome sequencing information of 3,000 participants who 
have Parkinson’s disease or are first-degree relatives of someone who has Parkinson’s 
disease (Herper, 2015).  The Genentech deal provides 23andMe $10 M upfront with the 
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potential of an additional $50 M for meeting milestones (Leuty, 2015).  For Nebula 
Genomics, George Church considered the possible monetization of an individual’s 
genome at $500.00 for access to specific information of interest per interested company 
(Cohen, 2018).  Several companies provide compensation to individuals who are eligible 
and participate in research including DNAsimple, Genos, LunaDNA, and EncrypGen. 
DNAsimple compensates individuals $50.00 each time they qualify for a study and 
submit a saliva sample (“DNAsimple,” 2018) while Genos’ compensation ranges from 
$50.00 - $250.00 for participation in their Research Beta program (“Genos,” 2018).  
LunaDNA proposes to issues shares of ownership in the company for people who join 
and contribute their DNA and health data (“LunaDNA,” 2018) while EncrypGen allows 
individuals to earn DNA tokens when they share their genomic information via 
blockchain (“EncrypGen,” 2018).  Table 15 summarizes the value of materials from the 
human body. 
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Table 15 
Examples of Values for Materials from the Human Body 
Case or Example Type Action Value 
Organ Brokers Estimated value Selling a 
single kidney 
Up to $10,000.00 
Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California 
Estimated value Price quote to 
patient 
$10,000.00 per liter of 
blood 
Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California 
Recompense for 
harm 
Physician sold 
cell line 
$330,000.00 
75,000 shares of stock 
Norman-Bloodsaw v. 
Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory 
Recompense for 
harm 
Settlement $2.2 M to 7 employees 
Burlington Northern, 
Santa Fe Railroad 
Corporation 
Recompense for 
harm 
ADA 
Violation 
$2.2 M to 36 
employees  
 
Tilousi v. Arizona State 
University 
Recompense for 
harm 
Settlement $700,000 to 41 
members of the 
Havasupai tribe 
 
Lowe v. Atlas Logistics 
Group Retail Services, 
Atlanta, LLC 
Recompense for 
harm 
GINA 
Violation 
$2.25 M to 2 
employees  
 
J.C. Bear Estimated value 
for access to 
genetic 
information 
Paper 
presented at 
10th 
International 
Congress of 
Human 
Genetics in 
Vienna, 
Austria 
At least $50,000.00 for 
access to each research 
subject’s genetic 
information, royalties 
from any profits, or a 
combination of the two 
George Church and 
Nebula Genomics 
Estimated value 
for access to 
genetic 
information 
Access to 
certain 
information of 
a patient’s 
genome 
$500.00 for access per 
company 
23andMe Payment for 
access to genetic 
information 
Sold access to 
Parkinson’s 
samples to 
Genentech 
$10 M initially for 
access to 3,000 
participant’s DNA 
 
Up to additional $50 M 
for achieving 
milestones 
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Up to $60 M total for 
access to 3,000 
participant’s DNA 
DNAsimple Payment for 
access to genetic 
information 
Access to an 
individual’s 
genomic 
information 
$50.00 for each saliva 
sample submitted per 
qualified study 
Genos Payment for 
access to genetic 
information 
Access to an 
individual’s 
genomic 
information 
$50.00 - $250.00 for 
participation in the 
Research Beta 
LunaDNA Payment for 
access to genetic 
information 
Access to an 
individual’s 
genomic and 
health 
information 
Shares of ownership in 
the company 
EncrypGen Payment for 
access to genetic 
information 
Access to an 
individual’s 
genomic 
information 
via blockchain 
DNA tokens 
Alaska Genetic Privacy 
Act of 2004 
Proposed civil 
penalties 
Civil penalties $5,000.00 for 
compensation to the 
victim  
 
$100,000.00 if the 
violation afforded the 
violator monetary gain 
or profit 
Colorado Proposed civil 
penalties 
Civil penalties The greater of: 
 
(I) Actual damages 
suffered by the 
individual.   
 
(II) $10.000 
 
Attorney fees and costs 
of action may also be 
recovered by the 
prevailing party. 
Georgia Proposed civil 
penalties 
Civil penalties Actual damages 
suffered by the 
individual.   
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Attorney fees and costs 
of action may also be 
recovered by the 
prevailing party. 
Louisiana Proposed civil 
penalties 
Civil penalties  (1i) Actual damages 
sustained as a result of 
the collection, storage, 
analysis, or disclosure, 
or $50,000, whichever 
is greater. 
(1ii) Treble damages, 
in any case where such 
a violation resulted in 
profit or monetary gain. 
(1iii) Attorney fees and 
costs of action may 
also be recovered by 
the prevailing party. 
 (2i) Any actual 
damages sustained as a 
result of the collection, 
analysis, or disclosure, 
or $100,000, whichever 
is greater. 
(2ii) Attorney fees and 
costs of action may 
also be recovered by 
the prevailing party 
 
GENETIC HACKING, ANONYMITY, AND RE-IDENTIFICATION 
 DNA is a unique identifier, and genetic information contained in the genome is 
unique to each individual (McGuire & Gibbs, 2006a, 2006b).  Even monozygotic twins’ 
genomes aren’t exactly identical (Bruder et. al., 2008).  Prior to the completion of the 
Human Genome Project, Clayton et. al. (1995) anticipated the possibility of anonymous 
DNA samples having their anonymity compromised.  The potential risk of using genetic 
databases to link anonymous DNA sequences back to identified individuals was also 
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anticipated (Sweeney, 1997; National Human Genome Research Institute, 1996).  Lin et. 
al. (2004) illustrated the ability to identify an individual with only 75 single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs).  In 2005, a teenage boy tracked down and found his anonymous 
sperm donor “father” by using a commercial genetic database service, Family Tree DNA, 
and other online resources (Stein, 2005).  Wendy Kramer, founder of Donor Sibling 
Registry, also used Family Tree DNA and the Internet to find her daughter’s anonymous 
sperm donor (Lehmann-Haupt, 2010).  Family histories are also being rewritten by DTC 
genetic testing companies like 23andMe and Ancestry.com that provide ancestry results 
and sometimes reveal family secrets including infidelity or adoption (Kolataaug, 2017).  
Aldhous and Reilly (2009) demonstrated how an individual (Aldhous) had his genome 
hacked by his co-author (Reilly) who amplified Aldhous’ DNA from a drinking glass and 
had it analyzed with few roadblocks.  The successful hacking of Aldhous’s genome was 
chronicled in detail to demonstrate vulnerabilities in the system, raise awareness about 
the potential for genome hacking, and advocate for laws to protect the privacy of an 
individual’s genomic information (Aldhous & Reilly, 2009).  The hacking of 300,000 
email/usernames and passwords from Ancestry’s RootsWeb server as well as the ninety-
two million usernames and passwords stolen from MyHeritage illustrates another form of 
genetic hacking (Wong, 2018; Blackham, 2017). 
 Green and Annas (2008) imagined the collection and analysis of DNA from 
presidential candidates to assess genetic risks, indicate ethnic background, or expose 
potential health problems of political opponents.  In October 2018, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren from Massachusetts used a DNA test in an attempt to bolster her claims that she 
is of Native American descent (Perrigo, 2018). Tribal leaders within the Cherokee Nation 
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and other indigenous communities expressed frustration because citizenship and cultural 
lineage are determined by sovereign tribal groups and not DNA testing (Horton, 2018). 
 Anonymity can no longer be assured in studies involving genomic testing (Korf, 
2013), and yet “individuals have an autonomy-based right to determine with whom they 
want to share their DNA data” (McGuire & Beskow, 2010, p. 371).  In a study of 30 
participants who underwent genomic sequencing through two NIH research protocols, 
several individuals asserted the importance of confidentiality as a form of control that is 
inherently a human right (Jamal et. al., 2014).  As the capability to re-identify the source 
of de-identified DNA samples increases, solutions to strengthen and streamline laws 
should be considered to govern whole-genome sequence data collection, protect against 
privacy breaches, and ensure accountability for violations that involve unauthorized use 
of an individual’s genetic information (“Genetic privacy,” 2013; Gutmann, 2013; 
Gutmann & Wagner, 2013). 
 Inconsistent federal policies regarding the interpretation of DNA identifiability 
produces confusion for patients, researchers, and policymakers (McGuire, 2008).  
Ethical, legal, and social implications abound regarding the use of DTC genetic testing 
along with third party services like private or public recreational genomic databases to 
identify individuals or their descendants.  The ability to identify anonymous individuals 
using genomic data has grown significantly in a short time (Schadt, Woo, & Hao, 2012; 
Im et. al., 2012; Homer et. al., 2008).  Gymrek et. al. (2013) demonstrated the ability to 
identify anonymous research subjects through the use of recreational genetic databases 
and Y chromosome short tandem repeats (Y-STRs).  “Molecular photofitting” is a 
developing technique that utilizes DNA to predict phenotypes, and it has resulted in 
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guiding some law enforcement agencies to suspects while leading to at least one 
confession by a murderer after seeing his sketched composite from DNA left at the crime 
scene (DeFrancesco, 2018; Miller, 2017). 
 Another technique known as “long-range familial searching” has gained notoriety 
after the capture of the alleged Golden State Killer.  The Golden State Killer is presumed 
responsible for the rape of more than fifty victims and the murder of at least twelve 
victims within the state of California between 1976 to 1986 (Arango, 2018).  The use of 
DNA and genealogy to solve the cold case known as the “Bear Brook Murders” led 
detectives to use the same type of technique for the Golden State Killer (Arango, 2018).  
DNA from the rape and murder of Charlene and Lyman Smith had been sitting in a 
freezer since 1980 until detectives had the DNA converted into a format that could be 
uploaded into GEDmatch, a public database for DNA and genealogical research 
(Jouvenal, 2018).  The analysis from GEDmatch returned several distant relatives of the 
killer, likened to third cousins, which allowed detectives to form twenty-five family trees 
(Jouvenal, 2018).  Through census information, obituaries, news clippings, gravesite 
locators, LexisNexis, websites, and police databases, the detectives identified great-great-
great grandparents who were common ancestors between the distant cousins and the 
killer (Jouvenal, 2018).  Investigators narrowed the potential suspects down to Joseph 
James DeAngelo and another man due to their age and having resided in similar locations 
as the killer (Jouvenal, 2018).  DNA from a dirty tissue found in Joseph James 
DeAngelo’s trash led authorities to arrest and charge him with multiple counts of murder 
(Harrison & Osborne, 2018).  His case is pending. 
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 The practice of long-range familial DNA searching within forensic databases like 
the U.S. National DNA Index System (NDIS), which is part of the Combined DNA Index 
System (CODIS), is controversial with ten states allowing for it while two states, 
Maryland and Washington D.C., have banned the practice. (Jouvenal et.al., 2018).  At 
least thirteen criminal cases from April to August 2018 (mostly cold cases but one as 
recent as April 2018) have reported using long-range familial searches to solve cases 
(Erlich et. al., 2018).  Through the use of identity-by-descent (IBD) segments of genetic 
relatives as well as the analysis of 1.28 million individuals who used DTC consumer 
genomics, Erlich et. al. (2018) predict that a match of a third cousin or closer relative will 
occur for approximately 60% of long-range familial searches using individuals of 
European descent.  Erlich et. al. (2018) also used an individual from the 1000 Genomes 
Project to demonstrate that re-identification of human subjects through long-range 
familial searching is possible. 
PRIVACY CONCERNS 
 The potential for invasions of genetic privacy continues to increase as 
technological advances involving genomics rapidly expand.  DNA is unlike a credit card 
whose number can be changed after fraudulent activity; it is a permanent identifier, and 
can be used in various ways including direct linkage to family members, forensic cases, 
discrimination, and providing information about an individual’s health (Roche & Annas, 
2006; Annas, 1995). Concerns about violations of genetic privacy and property rights 
have led some to call for a federal genetic privacy law (Roche & Annas, 2006). 
 A survey of 13,000 individuals about their attitudes toward consent and data-
sharing in biobank-based research revealed that 90% deemed health information privacy 
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important to them while 64% indicated that the privacy of their health information 
worried them (Sanderson et. al., 2017).  In the same study, the most highly endorsed 
statement (at 86%) was related to information needed about biobanking governance 
which stated “I would want to know what would happen if a researcher misused the 
health information in the biobank” (Sanderson et. al., 2017, p. 7).  Public trust is essential 
for participation in research and without proper privacy protections, the public’s trust 
could dwindle and slow the pace of or otherwise compromise research (McGuire & 
Gibbs, 2006b). 
 Due to the availability and use of DTC genetic testing, the public has become 
increasingly aware of and protective about how their DNA and genomic information is 
stored and used (Lewis et. al., 2012).  Class action lawsuits have been filed in Minnesota 
and Texas by parents which led to the destruction of 5.3 million residual dried blood 
samples in Texas alone (Javitt, 2013; Lewis et. al., 2012).  These cases illustrate the 
drastic consequences that can occur when consent is not obtained and the perspectives of 
individuals who contribute their biospecimens are overlooked (Javitt, 2013). 
 There are also growing concerns from experts about personal privacy and the use 
of nonforensic genealogical databases to conduct forensic searches for criminal suspects.  
Few legal barriers exist that limit law enforcement from conducting criminal searches 
with nonforensic genetic databases (Ram, Guerrini, & McGuire, 2018).  Ethical and legal 
concerns about long-range familial searches include threats to collective civil liberties, 
government genetic surveillance, and the use of relatives to identify suspects who never 
voluntarily shared their genetic information within a nonforensic database (Ram, 
Guerrini, & McGuire, 2018).  Some companies like 23andMe will not share customer 
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information unless legally compelled by the law while other companies like GEDmatch 
explicitly allow for information housed within their database to be searched by law 
enforcement agencies investigating sexual assault or homicide (Ram, Guerrini, & 
McGuire, 2018; Jouvenal et.al., 2018).  Some scholars have even argued that someone 
who is a relative of an individual within CODIS has more genetic privacy rights than if 
that person was a relative of someone in GEDmatch (Molteni, 2018).  Due to ethical and 
legal concerns as well as inconsistent laws governing nonforensic database searches by 
law enforcement, policies are needed to protect citizens from undue genetic searches 
without a relevant and reasonable cause.  Recommended policies include a Stored 
Genetics Act, setting prerequisites that must be met prior to conducting long-range 
familial searches, and defining genome-wide information as identifiable private 
information through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Erlich et. al., 
2018; Ram, Guerrini, & McGuire, 2018).  A politician in the Maryland House of 
Delegates is proposing a bill to restrict the use of nonforensic database searches in 
criminal investigations within Maryland while four states (California, Colorado, Texas, 
and Virginia) have implemented protocols regulating access and use of nonforensic 
databases for long-range familial searching (Jones, 2019). 
 Protecting genetic privacy by defining genetic information as property is a 
contested idea that has been debated for more than twenty-five years (Allen, 1997).  
Several scholars have advocated making genetic information the property of an 
individual (Annas, 1999; Colonna, 1998; Lin, 1996; Barrad, 1992; ASHG Ad Hoc 
Committee on DNA technology, 1988).  Recent works also support individuals having 
rights to their genetic data (Daley & Cranley, 2016; Evans, 2016; Karrow, 2016; Kish & 
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Topol, 2015; Lash, 2015).  Others have argued that individuals should not be granted 
property rights to their genetic information.  One major argument against property rights 
for genetic information relates to concerns that individuals could restrict access and 
subsequently chill research (Miller, 1968). Another argument posits that “the term 
‘property’ connotes control within the marketplace and therefore protects economic 
interests in genetic information” (Suter, 2004, p. 746). 
 Personal genetic ownership can be viewed as a bundle of limited property 
entitlements that include the right to access, the right to commercialize, and the right to 
exclude (Roberts, 2017).  Exploring progressive property theory for genetic information 
has been suggested since it acknowledges the lived human experience while not limiting 
itself strictly to costs and benefits (Roberts, 2017). 
 Laws often lag behind technological developments.  The technological advances 
within genomic sciences over the past five years including the ability to identify 
anonymized individuals via Y-STRs or IBD segments of genetic relatives signals the 
need for new genomic policies to protect citizens.  As the medical information commons 
develops, as sequencing costs decline, and more companies pay consumers for access to 
their genetic information, greater protections for individual genetic information is 
necessary.  The following section proposes a menu of national policy options to bolster 
the protections for individuals and their genetic information while reducing uncertainty, 
variability, and inconsistency from state to state. 
NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GENETIC PROPERTY, 
PIRACY, AND PRIVACY 
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 Technological advances coupled with an increase in direct-to-consumer genetic 
testing, clinical genetic testing, and large-scale biomedical research programs like the 
Precision Medicine Initiative’s All of Us program will only increase the potential for 
breaches of privacy.  Over 17 million people have participated in DTC autosomal DNA 
testing as of September 2018 (Larkin, 2018).  The ability to re-identify de-identified 
personal genomes and the potential for genetic surveillance of citizens through the use of 
nonforensic databases have serious ethical, legal, and social implications.  The first 
recommendation calls for a national policy to protect the privacy of participants who 
have donated their genomic information in de-identified form to scientific research.  The 
recommendation also calls to protect the privacy of citizens from undue genetic searches 
without relevant and reasonable cause.  Finally, the recommendation calls for the 
establishment of national guidelines to outline criteria that must be met to satisfy relevant 
and reasonable cause for law enforcement to legally compel nonforensic databases to 
assist in criminal investigations for heinous crimes like murder or sexual assault. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 1 – GENETIC PRIVACY POLICY 
The unauthorized re-identification of an individual using their de-identified 
genetic information is strictly prohibited unless re-identification could lessen or prevent a 
serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of the individual or others.  
Furthermore, the use of nonforensic databases for the identification of suspects as part of 
a criminal investigation is strictly prohibited unless a threshold is met within established 
national guidelines for relevant and reasonable cause.  If relevant and reasonable cause 
criteria are met, companies owning nonforensic databases can be legally compelled by 
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the law to assist law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations involving sexual 
assault or homicide. 
For the second recommendation, genetic piracy refers to the unauthorized 
collection, secondary use, or analysis of an individual’s genetic information without their 
expressed consent.  With recent examples of genetic theft in Peerenboom v. Perlmutter 
and the hacking of 300,000 email/usernames and passwords from Ancestry’s RootsWeb 
server, genetic piracy concerns will only continue to proliferate (Angrist, 2018; 
Blackham, 2017).  As technology accelerates and the cost to sequence the human genome 
decreases, this paper calls for a national policy to proactively prevent genetic piracy in 
the future. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 2 – GENETIC ANTI-PIRACY POLICY 
 The unauthorized acquisition, collection, storage, access, analysis, disclosure, 
surreptitious use, or reproduction of an individual’s genetic information is strictly 
prohibited. 
 Florida passed its law granting property rights to individuals for their genetic 
information in 1992 (Rothenberg, 1995).  A quarter-century later, individual state laws 
concerning genetic information as individual property are inconsistent.  Individuals 
already have the right to commercialize their DNA through several companies (see Table 
15).  The use of consent documents in DTC genetic testing companies, medical centers, 
and academic institutions to grant access to genetic information of an individual or the 
ability of individuals to control access to their genetic information on a case-by-case 
basis at other companies illustrates that right to access already exists.  Finally, the right to 
exclude others from using genetic information is evident in the blood spot lawsuits in 
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Texas and Minnesota which resulted in the destruction of millions of newborn baby 
blood samples.  Over 42 million individuals within the U.S. already have some form of 
property right in their genetic information when accounting for the five states who 
already have established property laws for genetic information (see Table 14).  This 
recommendation calls for a national policy to alleviate the confusion that exists from 
state to state regarding property rights for DNA samples, individual genetic information, 
and the results of DNA analysis. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 3 – GENETIC PROPERTY POLICY 
 DNA samples, genetic information, and the results of DNA analysis are the 
exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed. 
 The FBI Anti-Piracy Warning states that a fine of $250,000.00 and up to five 
years in prison could result for criminal copyright infringement (FBI Intellectual Property 
Theft/Piracy, 2018).  Although unauthorized reproduction or distribution of copyrighted 
materials is not the same as genetic piracy, the establishment of civil and criminal 
penalties for the theft of a form of property could help to establish a foundation for 
considering penalties for these policies.  Using select penalties from the five states who 
have existent genetic information property rights can also serve as a foundation.  
Recommended penalties for violating any of the three proposed policy recommendations 
are a Class A Misdemeanor and compensation of at least $10,000.00 and no more than 
$100,000.00 per violation. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Moving from policy recommendations to policy implementation will take 
political action.  Policy implementation requires a sponsor in the House of 
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Representatives or the Senate who will advocate and champion the bill through the 
following process:  the bill is sent to committee; the committee studies and decides if the 
bill should be released for a vote; the bill is voted upon and must pass both the house and 
the senate with a majority, then the bill has ten days to be signed into law or vetoed by 
the President (USAGov, 2019).  This is the most straightforward path for policy 
recommendations to follow in order to become law, but the path does not mention the 
many potential competing interests, obstacles, or delays that the recommendation could 
face including other national priorities and policies, timing, lobbyists who work for 
organizations that are against the proposed policy, activist groups, other members of the 
House of Representatives or the Senate, and the President’s agenda just to name a few. 
 Prophylactic genetic legislation has not always been successful, and it took 
thirteen years for GINA to finally become a law.  A major purpose for enacting GINA 
was to alleviate the public’s concern that their genetic test results could be used against 
them.  At the same time, GINA protected the public from discrimination while 
encouraging them to participate in new genetic technologies, research, and testing 
(Areheart & Roberts, 2019).  GINA could have been drafted as a privacy or a property 
law but instead Congress selected GINA to be an antidiscrimination statute (Roberts, 
2011).  GINA does not provide individuals with any property rights in their genetic 
information nor does it provide authority to individuals in deciding how their genetic 
information is used (Roberts, 2011). 
 The challenges that the proposed policy recommendations could face prior to and 
during the implementation process are both old and emerging.  For over two decades, 
defining who owns genetic information has been controversial and fiercely debated 
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(Roberts, 2017).  Although many people presume ownership of their DNA, there are no 
widespread legal property rights granted to individuals for their DNA (Roberts, 2017).  
Most recently in Cole and Peerenboom, courts have looked past previous precedence in 
Moore and Greenberg by allowing claims of conversion to move forward (Roberts, 
2017). 
 Over the same period of time, biotech companies, researchers, and scholars have 
claimed that broad protections of an individual’s genetic information or providing 
individuals rights to their genetic information could ultimately stymie research (Roberts, 
2017).  The genetic material contained within biospecimens is of high value both 
commercially and scientifically, and participants in research are starting to advocate for 
control, access, and compensation – a term known as “biorights” (Roberts, 2017; Daley 
& Cranley, 2016). 
 Within the privacy space, a major development which makes the recommended 
privacy policy more relevant than ever is the announcement made by Family Tree DNA 
that it is working with the FBI on cold cases by allowing agents to search its database of 
more than a million DNA profiles (Hernandez, 2019).  From genealogists to law 
professors, sentiments after hearing the news ranged from feelings that consumer trust 
had been violated to comparing it to the creation of a national de-facto DNA database 
(Hernandez, 2019).  A bill in Maryland, sponsored by Delegate Charles Sydnor, seeks to 
prohibit the use of DTC genetic testing databases to solve crimes (Barnes, 2019).  
Advocates for this paper’s recommended privacy policy will likely cite the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as a major reason for seeking to enact this policy 
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into law while opponents will likely focus on claims of justice as well as supporting law 
enforcement in solving violent crimes by any means necessary. 
 If there are two driving forces that accelerate the likelihood of these policy 
recommendations eventually becoming enacted into law, they would be the increasing 
value placed on information and the rapid development of new scientific technologies in 
genomics including identification of individuals through long-range familial DNA 
searching.  As scandals like Cambridge Analytica or the hacking of Presidential elections 
using social media increase, the public is becoming more aware of how their information 
is both valuable and should be protected from abuse and manipulation.  The same process 
will likely occur within genomics.  Examples in this article show that genetic hacking of 
databases and the use of public DTC genetic databases by the FBI are already occurring 
and will likely grow as the technology rapidly develops.  To pitch this bundle of genomic 
policy recommendations, it may help to formulate a name that would resonate with 
individuals while providing some context to the proposed policies.  An idea is to name 
the proposed bundle of genomic policy recommendations “The Lacks’ Law: Policies to 
protect citizens’ genomic privacy, prevent genomic piracy, and establish their genetic 
information as their property.” 
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CHAPTER 4 
ESSAY 3: SOCIO-TECHNICAL FUTURES OF OUR LIFESPAN: A SCENARIO 
EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF LIFE UNTIL DEATH 
The eugenic past has much to teach about how to avoid repeating its mistakes - 
not to mention its sins. But what bedeviled our forebears will not necessarily vex 
us, certainly not in the same ways. In human genetics as in so many other areas of 
life, the flow of history compels us to think and act anew - not about eugenics but 
about the control of human genetic information by geneticists, the media, insurers, 
employers, and government (Kevles, 2003, p. 317). 
Futures studies encourage the development of imaginaries and the design of new 
knowledge systems through various methods including but not limited to scenarios, 
forecasting, foresight, and prediction. The creation of multiple futures is promoted 
through the strategic thought processes fostered by various types of scenarios and 
scenario planning (Amer, Daim, & Jetter, 2013; Börjeson et. al., 2006). Fruitful outcomes 
in futures studies can materialize when scenario planning and design intersect with one 
another (Selin, Kimbell, Ramirez, & Bhatti, 2015).  Futures studies can also utilize actor 
network approach, sociotechnical imaginaries, and anticipatory governance when 
attempting to create future scenarios. Actor network approach asserts that institutions, 
organizations, people, and even artifacts design and negotiate socio-technical systems 
(Latour, 1992). Sociotechnical imaginaries are visions of desirable futures through 
“collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and 
fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects” (Jasanoff & Kim, 
2009, p. 120).  Anticipatory governance encourages the responsible development of 
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emerging knowledge-based technologies throughout the development process through 
foresight, engagement, and integration (Guston, 2014; Barben, Fisher, Selin, & Guston, 
2008). 
Imaginaries involving genomics are not new to futures studies, and personalized 
medicine has been conceptualized as a sociotechnical imaginary of modern biomedicine 
(Tarkkala, Helén, & Snell, 2018).  Many people place stock into the possible power of 
genetic prediction due to its promise for the discovery of their own predisposition to 
disease (Nelkin & Tancredi, 1989). Both desirable and undesirable futures involving 
emerging technologies like genomics or precision medicine enable choices to be explored 
and allow insight into potential problems to be extrapolated (Miller & Bennett, 2008). 
Futures studies and predictions of genetics and genomics have examined the advantages, 
challenges, and limitations of genetic susceptibility testing (Stemerding, Swierstra, & 
Boenink, 2010), global genetic carrier testing (Beaudet, 2015), next-generation 
sequencing (NGS) (Pillar, Isakov, & Shomron, 2014), whole-genome sequencing (WGS) 
in the general population (Lindor, Thibodeau, & Burke, 2017), and genomic sequencing 
of newborns at birth (Leach, 2009). Scenario development involving the future of 
medical diagnostics (Selin, 2008) illustrates how exposure to “the coproduction of 
scientific and technological artifacts…can cause scientists and engineers to, upon 
reflection, alter the agendas and strategic vision of science-in-the-making” (Guston, 
2014, p. 229). This study seeks to design socio-technical futures involving precision 
medicine through the development of a complex scenario employing a socio-technical 
system for documenting human lifespans within the United States using actor network 
approach, sociotechnical imaginaries, and anticipatory governance. 
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PRECISION MEDICINE 
 In 2011, the National Academies published a report entitled “Towards Precision 
Medicine” in which the feasibility of restructuring the taxonomy of human disease 
through the use of molecular biology was explored. During the 2015 State of the Union 
address, President Obama called for the Precision Medicine Initiative in order to yield 
precision medicine’s promise – “delivering the right treatment at the right time - every 
time - to the right person” (Jackson, 2015). The two main components of the initiative 
include an immediate focus on cancer and a long-term approach to better understand 
human health and disease by generating new knowledge and knowledge systems (Collins 
& Varmus, 2015). Three of the most important future objectives for precision medicine 
are to 1) securely and ethically acquire, process, store, and network massive amounts of 
patient information (genetic, medical history, wearables, environmental factors) in order 
to extrapolate commonalities and dissimilarities among individuals and subpopulations to 
yield better individualized treatments; 2) attempt to reduce complexity while embracing 
uncertainty in order to improve individual health by using multiple forms of medical 
information to elucidate risk factors, nudge behaviors, and predict undesirable outcomes 
through preventative measures or future treatments, and 3) increase the legibility of 
diseases or disease states in order to improve clinical decision making and treatments by 
incorporating individual patient values. 
LIFESPAN – A SOCIO-TECHNICAL FUTURE 
The development of a future technology called Lifespan will be explored along 
with the socio-technical future it creates and the governance necessary for its 
implementation. The design and development of Lifespan reconceptualizes biomedical 
  89 
research, patient engagement, insurance, laws, biobanks, drug development, the health 
care delivery system, and how the human lifespan is documented. Lifespan is intended to 
be a national system developed, deployed, and regulated by the U.S. government through 
agencies, national associations, and laws including but not limited to the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the American College of Medical Genetics 
and Genomics (ACMG), the American Medical Association (AMA), the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the U.S. Department of Justice through 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008 (GINA), the American Hospital Association (AHA), and the AARP. The altruism 
of enrolling in Lifespan honors and rewards patients by providing incentives including 
robust health insurance, reduced drug costs, and opportunities for joining clinical trials 
for their particular disease or the benefit of others. The system has the potential to 
profoundly and positively affect the economy, human health, morbidity, mortality, and 
the national workforce. 
DOCUMENTING LIFE TO DEATH 
This scenario introduces the socio-technical system, Lifespan, with enrollment 
occurring at birth and ending at death. Anyone can elect to enroll or unenroll in the 
program at any given time. Informed consent is obtained from parents before they elect to 
enroll their child into Lifespan at birth.  By enrolling their newborn, the newborn 
undergoes standard newborn screening where the heel is pricked and blood is collected, 
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stored on a Guthrie card, and sent to a lab for whole-genome sequencing. The newborn’s 
profile is created within Lifespan, the whole-genome sequence is uploaded and stored 
within a secure national databank, and newborn screening for various diseases is initiated. 
Paternity testing for newborns is also conducted upon enrollment by either accessing the 
parent’s or parents’ DNA in the system or acquiring it directly from them. 
By being enrolled in Lifespan the newborn is automatically covered by a national 
health insurance system that has stipulations to be met for continuous enrollment 
including routine check-ups for newborns, vaccinations, and annual physicals. The 
insurance system is supported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
insurance companies, and businesses that participate in employer provided insurance. The 
establishment of the insurance is through federal law and prohibits all forms of 
discrimination based on genetic test results. Enrollees are provided medical treatment, 
long-term care insurance, long-term disability insurance, and life insurance as long as 
they remain in the program and follow established criteria. The goal would be for 
enrollees to experience significantly reduced premiums, co-pays, drug costs, medical 
expenses, and access to experimental drugs or treatments compared to having insurance 
from external insurers with less coverage, decreased benefits, and much higher rates. 
     Recommendations for Preventive Pediatric Health Care established by the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) will set standards of care that encourage 
continuity of care from newborns to adolescents until they reach twenty-one years of age. 
To remain enrolled in Lifespan, parents must adhere to the standards set by the AAP. 
Newborns will undergo well-child visits in order to ensure they are healthy, thriving, and 
meeting milestones. Well-child visits include measurements, physical examinations, 
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vaccinations, bloodwork, and obtaining results from whole-genome sequencing through 
the pediatrician and a genetic counselor. Once results are shared with parents, they are 
provided access to their child’s Lifespan account and dashboards which will be 
continuously updated with new information throughout the child’s life including genetic, 
biomedical, social, and environmental information. Results indicating potential genetic 
diseases or predispositions will allow parents to experience anticipatory guidance from 
experts, proactively prepare for the child’s medical needs, learn dosage response and drug 
interactions for an array of medications, understand risks for increased susceptibility, join 
disease support groups and coalitions, and receive notifications for all clinical trials 
involving their child’s disease or predisposition. 
Annual physical exams and screenings will become standard at five years of age 
until death. Physicals will include physical examination, bloodwork, measurements, and 
an overall assessment using Lifespan. Wearable device information that has been 
uploaded over the year will allow a real-time snapshot for clinicians to discuss health and 
wellness, physical exercise, exposure to environmental risks, and any abnormalities that 
may appear. The patient’s whole-genome will be sequenced annually and updated in the 
system. In addition, screening the patient’s blood using liquid biopsies would allow for 
proactive screening, early detection, and prevention. Results from blood screening would 
also be uploaded into Lifespan. All results combined will allow the clinician to 
proactively educate patients about increased susceptibility and ways to avoid risk through 
behavior modification, diet, and environmental exposure. 
Patient literacy and knowledge about disease states will experience a paradigm 
shift as patients move from understanding disease as a binary system to understanding 
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disease as a continuum influenced by genetics, the environment, and social factors. 
Through patient input into the system, ways of effectively communicating risk will be 
identified and implemented. The identification of patients who experience success with 
behavior modification or lifestyle change based on susceptibility results can aid in the 
development of new methods for interventions. 
Lifespan is a secure national databank that collects, stores, analyzes, and networks 
patient information. Electronic medical records will be required to be interoperable with 
Lifespan in order for patient information to be made seamlessly available for clinicians, 
pharmacies, clinics, and hospitals. The design and implementation of a data sharing 
platform for research utilizing either a gatekeeper model or an open-access model could 
benefit the community greatly (Bertagnolli, et. al., 2017). The use of blockchain in 
Lifespan may also be implemented in order to allow for user controlled portable identity, 
the maintenance of patient information exchanges and transactions over time, and the 
storage of individual patient medical assets. The governance of patient information using 
blockchain would allow patients to control how, when, and by whom their information is 
used. By requiring interoperability and using blockchain, the patient’s medical 
information will be accessible, secure, portable, and readily available when granted 
access by the patient. 
Significant and positive implications for research and society are possible with a 
large databank of participants. Research studies that meet the criteria to be granted access 
to the databank would have access to significant amounts of patient data that could 
bolster the power of their study to be generalizable to the public. Subpopulations of 
patients with identical variants or mutations could be identified and invited to participate 
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in clinical trials. Drugs developed using Lifespan as well as clinical trial results would be 
made available to the patients who participated at either no cost or significantly reduced 
prices compared to market value. The databank could also facilitate bone marrow and 
organ donor matching. Finally, granting controlled access to law enforcement agencies 
investigating serious crimes or missing persons may serve as a deterrent of crime. 
Upon death, minimally invasive autopsies (MIAs) would be performed on those 
who died of known causes and weren’t minors. Complete autopsies would still be 
performed on minors, suspicious deaths, or deaths where the cause was unknown. The 
autopsy report would include the decedent’s cause and manner of death, pathology report, 
and final whole-genome sequence. The autopsy report would be the final information 
collected in order to complete and close a person’s lifespan. By participating in Lifespan, 
a patient’s funeral expenses would be covered. The creation of a necrogenomic registry 
would allow for individuals who didn’t participate in Lifespan to have their information 
collected and stored in the system at the time of death. 
The creation of Lifespan as a new paradigm in health care will require the creation 
of jobs that don’t currently exist, the restructuring of health insurance and the health care 
delivery system, the education of clinicians in genetics, a radical increase in the 
workforce for genetic counselors and bioinformaticians, and a drastic increase in the 
number of seats available at medical and health professions schools in order to increase 
the number of pediatricians, primary care providers, medical geneticists, and forensic 
pathologists that will be needed. 
Lifespan is a revolutionary socio-technical system that seeks to improve the 
overall health outcomes of individuals by encouraging proactive, preventative, and 
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holistic health care using patient information and medical technology. The successful 
implementation of Lifespan could drastically reduce health care costs annually but even 
more so influence long-term, national economic prosperity by increasing the lifespan of 
healthier people who live longer. This could ultimately lead to a more productive national 
workforce. 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL ARTIFACTS OF LIFESPAN 
The development of new socio-technical systems is constructed from the 
interactions of people, institutions, and artifacts. Understanding these interactions and 
identifying the artifacts that give rise to new socio-technical systems can elucidate 
underlying politics, values, and knowledge systems. The design and evolution of the 
Lifespan scenario will be traced from the socio-technical artifacts and interactions that led 
to its establishment. 
Both artifacts and technologies aid in ordering our lives (Winner, 2010). 
Technical artifacts can be viewed and interpreted in different ways by different groups 
(Pinch & Bijker, 1987), and artifacts can have political qualities (Winner, 2010).  How 
socio-technical systems are created or exist can provide insight into how power and 
authority are organized and structured while allowing us to conceptualize how human life 
and activities will be altered or reconstituted with the implementation of a new socio-
technical system (Winner, 2010). 
THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
The current health care system is “one of the most complex socio-technological 
systems in modern societies” (Miller, Ross, Bennett, & Hurlbut, 2016, p. 537). The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides 
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information regarding health care and health outcomes for 35 member countries and other 
partnering countries. The United States currently spends more on health per capita and in 
relation to gross domestic product (GDP) than any other OECD country (OECD, 2015).  
The United States spent 16.4% of its GPD on health and USD 8,713 for each of its 
residents (OECD, 2015).  According to the OECD (2015), the level of health spending in 
the U.S. was almost 40% higher than the next biggest spender and two-and-a-half times 
the average level of spending for all OECD countries. Despite the significant spending on 
health, the United States has an infant mortality rate of 5 deaths per 1,000 live births as 
compared to the current OECD average of 3.8 deaths per 1,000 live births placing it at a 
tie for 31 out of 44 countries (OECD, 2015). Additionally, life expectancy within the 
U.S. has seen modest gains as compared to other OECD countries with the U.S. being at 
78.8 years of age, but it is still below the OECD average of 80.5 years of age (OECD, 
2015). The U.S. tied at 27 out of 44 countries for life expectancy at birth (OECD, 2015). 
The exorbitant spending on health by the U.S. compared to its overall health 
outcomes produces understanding as to how a system like Lifespan could be welcomed 
and implemented. The current fee-for-service model within the U.S. health care delivery 
system has at times been referenced as ‘sick care.’ A new socio-technical system for 
health care would aim to lower costs, increase health outcomes, improve quality, and 
proactively influence (rather than reactively treat) the overall health of patients (Berwick, 
Nolan, & Whittington, 2008). 
ARTIFACTS OF LIFE AND DEATH 
 Within the U.S., life and death are officially documented through birth and death 
certificates. Documentation for both life and mortality proved to be an administrative 
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strategy by the state or government to manage society by numbers through the collection 
of data and use of statistics (Porter, 2003). The standardization of birth certificates in the 
U.S. occurred in the 1930’s with a revision in 1989 that offered greater accuracy, 
uniformity, and completeness (Brumberg, Dozer, & Golombek, 2012). Diagnosing 
metabolic diseases like phenylketonuria (PKU) was what led Robert Guthrie to develop a 
method during the 1960’s for newborn screening by collecting blood from a heel prick 
and placing it on filter paper for analysis (Paul & Brosco, 2013). The cards containing 
dried blood spots of individual newborns are known as Guthrie cards and are typically 
stored over a period of time (Paul & Brosco, 2013). Guthrie cards have recently 
experienced intense legal scrutiny and in some cases mandatory destruction due to 
potential violations of genetic privacy (Brase, 2014). 
 Each state within the U.S. determines if cause and manner of death are certified 
by a medical examiner (possesses formal medical training), a county coroner (elected 
official that may or may not possess formal medical training), or a mixture of both 
(National Research Council, 2009). Davis (1997) traces the history of death certification 
and how it originated as a method to generate money through fines for the crown by 
classifying murder or suicide to the use of autopsy to generate information for public 
health and medical science benefits. Medicolegal autopsies are typically performed for 
unusual or suspicious deaths as well as the death of infants and adolescents to assess the 
presence of disease, the manner of death, and cause of death (National Research Council, 
2009). Autopsies rates have declined significantly in the past decade and are not currently 
performed on a majority of decedents within the U.S. despite their potential to provide 
useful information about disease, health, and genetics (Burton & Collins, 2016). 
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GENOMIC ARTIFACTS 
 The completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003 laid the foundation for 
imagining, designing, and completing a massive “big science” project involving 
genomics. The Human Genome Project led to the creation of laws and the advent of 
precision medicine (Collins, Morgan, & Patrinos, 2003). Concerns about potential 
discrimination caused congress to enact the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(2008) known as GINA which prohibited the use of genetic information for health 
insurance and employment decisions. Precision medicine was one of the top biomedical 
policies within the Obama administration as indicated by the launch of the million person 
Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) – All of Us program which was budgeted $200 
million in FY 2016 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016). The 
bipartisan 21st Century Cures Act (2016) was one of the final laws singed into effect by 
the Obama administration to provide $1.5 billion over ten years to PMI. From 2012 to 
2015, the National Institutes of Health has spent on average $7.395 billion on genetics 
annually (National Institutes of Health, 2016). Significant advances in genomic 
sequencing over the past two decades have caused a shift in genetic testing of single 
genes to the testing of the whole-genome. 
 Genetic testing, national genomic registries, and biobanks are all biomedical 
technological systems that have important implications for those who interact with them. 
Biomolecular databases and biobanks are socio-technical systems that establish science 
communication regimes (Hilgartner, 1995) and should allow for continuous interaction 
and input from participants throughout their involvement (Saha & Hurlbut, 2011). 
Understanding the human genome requires large-scale citizen participation (Pillar, 
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Isakov, & Shomron, 2014) and should actively engage participants as agents who possess 
memory, knowledge, imagination, insight to help govern the system (Jasanoff, 2003). 
These technological systems are also impacted, shaped, and evolved by users, 
communities, and societies. For example, the technological architecture and deployment 
of breast cancer genetic testing differs greatly within the United Kingdom compared to 
the United States and subsequently yields varying user experiences depending on the 
particular system (Parthasarathy, 2005). 
 Well-established national registries like the Danish Civil Registration System, 
which houses information about all individuals alive and living in Denmark, have the 
potential to significantly increase knowledge and understanding about diseases and 
population health (Pedersen et. al., 2006). The potential for a Danish necrogenomic 
registry linked to the Danish Civil Registration System could supply genomic data from 
decedents to be matched with long-term health outcomes already tracked within their 
database (Hedley & Christiansen, 2016). The UK Biobank (2017) has collected blood, 
saliva, and urine samples from 500,000 people for future analysis while the leading 
genetics company in Iceland, deCODE, already has over one-third of the Iceland 
population’s DNA in a database (Kirby, 2014). The 51,515 participants within the 
Estonian Biobank of the Estonian Genome Center (2017) signed broad informed consent 
when they donated their genes. Kuwait is the first country to ever pass a law that will 
require all citizens and visitors to provide a DNA sample to be stored in a governmental 
database (Lee, 2016). The Kuwaiti law is not meant to provide information to citizens 
about their health, to diagnose disease, or perform biomedical research (Lee, 2016). 
There have also been genetic test registries established by agencies like the NIH to help 
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alleviate clinician and patient confusion by centralizing critical information about 
available genetic tests and result interpretations (Kuehn, 2010). 
 Emerging technologies, research, and creative initiatives intertwine to establish a 
rapidly evolving socio-technical system involving genomics. Through a randomized 
clinical trial known as the BabySeq Project, researchers at Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital and Boston Children’s Hospital performed whole exome sequencing (WES) on 
newborns to determine potential childhood illnesses (Fliesler, 2016). The Deciphering 
Developmental Disorders Study (2017) recruited nearly 14,000 children with severe 
undiagnosed developmental disorders and sequenced the exomes of 4,293 families to find 
94 genes enriched through de novo mutations. New technologies like liquid biopsies 
(Chen, 2016) and immunosignature systems (Stafford et. al., 2014) are attempting to 
perform early detection of cancer through the use of blood. Veritas offers whole-genome 
sequencing at $999 which includes sequencing the patient’s entire genome, a phone app 
to access their genome, and the ability to speak with a genetic counselor (Regalado, 
2016). The era of the $100 genome using whole-genome sequencing is near according to 
Illumina (Keshavan, 2017). 
 Human longevity and lifespan are of interest to many people including 
entrepreneurs, researchers, individuals, and the government. The human lifespan is 
presumed to be fixed with 122 years of age being the maximum age at death ever 
recorded for a person (Dong, Milholland, & Vijg, 2016). Human Longevity is a company 
that offers the Health Nucleus program in which individualized services including DNA 
sequencing, analysis of a person’s microbiome and metabolome, and physical scans are 
offered to enrolled patients (Zimmer, 2015). Through the collection and analysis of 
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various fluids and tissues from the body, minimally invasive autopsies (MIAs) instead of 
full autopsies could increase the rate that autopsies are performed while providing 
additional information at death pertaining to not only disease but aging and longevity 
(Kean, 2015). 
LIFESPAN – GOVERNANCE, ETHICS, AND VALUES 
Patients, providers, healthcare institutions, and regulators will all need to be smart 
about how they design and inhabit the socio-technical relationships that link 
health information devices to values, behaviors, sensibilities, relationships, and 
institutional practices” (Miller, Ross, Bennett, & Hurlbut, 2016, p. 536). 
Lifespan is an extremely complex socio-technical system that has the potential to 
treat, cure, and prevent disease and disability; however, technological optimism for the 
system should be approached with caution. For this emerging technology, responsible 
innovation through anticipatory governance should be enacted at the initial stages of 
concept through development and beyond. Anticipatory governance is defined as “a 
broad-based capacity extended through society that can act on a variety of inputs to 
manage emerging knowledge-based technologies while such management is still 
possible” (Guston, 2008, vi). Multiple stakeholders including agencies, experts, and 
citizens should participate in the anticipatory governance of Lifespan. 
Regulatory agencies will need to consider the reproducibility, reliability, and 
accuracy of results, how information is conveyed to patients, and how new methods and 
information will be relayed back to participants. The security and privacy of each 
individual’s genomic, medical, social, behavioral, and environmental information will be 
of paramount importance. Governmental agencies like the NIH, HHS, CMS, and many 
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more will be responsible for a multitude of large-scale tasks including the long-term 
creation and implementation of the infrastructure for Lifespan, population health analysis 
and outcomes, defining reimbursement rules, and many more. The legislative and 
executive branches will need to work together collaboratively and in a bipartisan fashion 
to successfully create laws and funding mechanisms to implement and sustain the system. 
The judicial branch will become involved as the new paradigm for health care interacts 
with individuals from all walks of life. 
Vulnerable and protected populations will require the utmost care and attention 
when forming the system. The participation and recommendations from marginalized 
communities who have been coerced and taken advantage of by research and researchers 
in the past should be welcomed and included. Incidents like the Tuskegee syphilis study, 
the forced sterilization of the mentally disabled as well as Native American women, and 
Henrietta Lacks are only a few examples of why it will be imperative to involve key 
stakeholders to ensure extreme vigilance and anticipatory governance will protect and 
serve their sovereignty, respect their past, and honor their future. 
Legal issues within personalized medicine may abound with regulatory hurdles 
slowing progress juxtaposed to the potential acceleration of precision medicine due to 
physician and manufacturing liability (Marchant, Campos-Outcalt, Lindor, 2011; 
Marchant, 2007). Legal consequences for violating patient confidentiality currently exist 
but will need to become more robust for a system like Lifespan. In addition, foresight will 
allow for the creation of legislation and laws that will prevent discrimination not only for 
employment and health insurance but all forms of discrimination including but not 
limited to disease predisposition as well as disease presentation. The Affordable Cara Act 
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(ACA) was a crucial bill for people with Huntington’s disease since it closed a loophole 
that had permitted insurance companies to refuse coverage if a person had a known 
illness which might be discovered through genetic testing (Eriksen, 2017). 
The allowance of law enforcement agencies and federal agencies like the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to have limited and controlled access to Lifespan could 
prove to be a double-edged sword. Extremely violent crimes may decrease by knowing 
that law enforcement agencies could access individual information including whole-
genome sequences in addition to data supplied by wearables including but not limited to 
distance traveled, location at a given time, temperature, and heart rate. Counter to the 
positive of potentially decreasing crime, individuals may be extraordinarily apprehensive 
to donate their information into Lifespan should law enforcement or the government be 
able to use the information for broad surveillance, dragnets, or without strict limitations 
like requiring a warrant or subpoena for database access. Other potential legal 
implications include determining paternity at birth for eligibility to enter Lifespan. At 
first, this may appear controversial and unnecessary, but ultimately, this policy would aid 
in identifying fathers for single mothers, reduce paternity fraud, and reduce legal cases 
that may occur years later regarding custody, visitation, and child support should the 
presumed father not be the biological father. Another legal issue to consider is when 
should genetic predispositions (like BRCA1/2) or fatal genetic conditions like 
Huntington’s disease be revealed to children, minors, or young adults. These are only a 
few of the numerous legal ramifications and laws that would need to be anticipated prior 
to the system’s deployment. 
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Determining the types of consent and systems to be used for data-sharing will 
have significant consequences for all involved. A major debate regarding consent within 
biobanks revolves around whether broad or dynamic consent should be enacted 
(Steinsbekk, Myskja, & Solberg, 2013). The use of blockchain for dynamic consent may 
be feasible and allow individuals to select how and when their personal information is 
used and shared; however, broad consent is gaining traction due to the endorsement 
provided within the revised Common Rule (Menikoff, Kaneshiro, & Pritchard, 2017). 
Whether the system is publicly available via open-access, semi-open, or fully closed will 
determine how individual information is presented and used. There is a high probability 
that de-identified data within an open-access platform for data-sharing could be re-
identified in the future as genomic technology accelerates. Semi-closed systems that 
enact a gatekeeper function use “a distinct entity to house information in a central 
repository, with access to specific data sets that are provided to qualified research teams 
on the basis of a research proposal review by an independent expert committee” 
(Bertagnolli, et. al., 2017, p. 1178). The type of consent and platform selected for 
Lifespan must instill safety, trust, and security for the individuals whose data is collected 
and stored within it. 
Insurers and employers will play a vital role in the success or failure of a socio-
technical system of this scale. Insurers and employers would require the benefits and cost 
of Lifespan to outweigh the benefits and costs of the current system. Should Lifespan 
produce a healthier workforce, the employers would benefit greatly by having employees 
who take less sick leave. Using a delayed aging scenario, Goldman et. al. (2013) illustrate 
how slowing the aging process (senescence) to increase life expectancy to 2.2 years could 
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ultimately yield $7.1 trillion over a fifty year period of time. This is one of the economic 
arguments for insurers, employers, and those within the health care delivery system to 
adopt a system like Lifespan. For those who elect to not join the employee sponsored or 
governmental sponsored plan within Lifespan, the insurance companies would be able to 
charge a much higher rate compared to the reduced amounts for being enrolled in 
Lifespan. Inducement to participate by employers into a system like Lifespan is a possible 
slippery slope and should be approached carefully, but the goal would be for people to 
participate from birth which would seamlessly transfer whether employed or not. In 
addition, incentives through Lifespan could provide all forms of insurance versus 
insurance policies outside of Lifespan which would only provide health insurance at a 
higher cost. One study provides insight regarding how people react when they learn about 
possible increased susceptibility to a debilitating disease – Alzheimer’s. People who 
tested positive for Apolipoprotein E (APOE) had no significant changes in their 
purchasing of health, life, or disability insurance, but they were more likely to change 
long-term care insurance by 5.76 times due to an increased predisposition to develop 
Alzheimer’s (Zick et. al., 2005). Individuals do change their behaviors regarding 
purchasing insurance when confronted with a deadly or debilitating genetic disposition. 
Lifespan would provide peace of mind to individuals since they would be protected 
against all forms of discrimination while having access to all forms of insurance at an 
affordable price regardless of predisposition, disability, or disease. 
Economic incentives have the potential to transfigure precision medicine through 
the use of pricing, access, innovation, and development (Stern, Alexander, & Chandra, 
2017). Economics and incentives drive large-scale sociotechnical systems like Lifespan. 
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Patients who take the anticoagulant drug, warfarin, have tremendous variability for 
optimal dosing and efficacy. Should genetic testing be used to properly dose for warfarin, 
then substantial savings could be generated within the health care delivery system by 
preventing an estimated 17,000 strokes annually (McWilliam, Lutter, & Nardinelli, 2008, 
2006). Another example is the estimated annual health care cost savings of $6.04 million 
if patients who were diagnosed with metastatic colorectal cancer were screened for the 
KRAS gene before beginning treatment (Shankaran et. al., 2009). With these two 
examples alone, the cost savings are tremendous. Imagine the long-term savings for the 
health care delivery system, the unnecessary disabilities prevented, and the productive 
lives saved if these types of indicators and predispositions were readily available to 
individuals at birth. 
Medical education will need to drastically change to include personalized 
medicine within the curriculum being taught to future clinicians. An entire new field of 
health professions may emerge to meet the growing demands that Lifespan would cause. 
A new type of health professional may ensure annual physicals are conducted, design the 
patient interface or dashboard to interact with their information, use bioinformatics to 
analyze and synthesize vast amounts of data on a constant basis, counsel patients about 
their genetic, social, and environmental information, engage in behavioral interventions 
and risk education, process insurance, remove people from insurance, and identify 
populations for clinical research due to their available information. 
Society as a whole will need to determine if this technology’s benefits are greater 
than its potential costs. This can be achieved by assessing and understanding society’s 
public values which are defined as “providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, 
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benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the 
obligations of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (c) the principles on 
which governments and policies should be based” (Bozeman, 2007, p. 13). Health is a 
public value held in high esteem by many citizens within a society; however, other public 
values may take priority over health including but not limited to freedom, autonomy, 
privacy, safety, and justice. One way to assess a large-scale, public scientific system like 
Lifespan is through public value mapping which is an “approach to identifying the public 
value premises of public policy and then tracking their evolution and impacts on policies 
and, ultimately, social outcomes” (Bozeman & Sarewitz, 2011, p. 13; Bozeman, 2003). 
Citizens are essential for the successful development and governance of any 
complex socio-technical system, and this holds true for Lifespan. Individuals are at the 
core of this system because no matter who the individual is – everyone eventually gets 
sick. Each individual is uniquely complex with their own identity, genetics, fingerprints, 
personality, behaviors, attitudes, and values. A system like Lifespan could contribute 
greatly to the knowledge system involving life and death, but it should not be viewed as a 
deterministic system that will find a cure for all diseases. Instead, the goal with a system 
like Lifespan is to 1) amass a substantially large amount of individual participants to 
accurately assess disease risk; 2) better understand how multiple genes, the environment, 
medical history, and social factors affect disease states; 3) find treatments for diseases if 
not cures; 4) reward and honor individuals who participate in the system; 5) provide 
better health outcomes by lowering cost, spreading risk, incentivizing participation, and 
improving quality; 6) increase the health and overall lifespan of those involved; 7) 
proactively rather than reactively address disease risks and predispositions; 8) provide a 
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personalized interface or dashboard for real-time assessment of an individual’s current 
health, relevant clinical trials, and a centralized place for the storage of all health 
information including medical records, and 9) incrementally record individual human life 
from birth until death. 
Understanding the values of individuals during the creation of a complex socio-
technical system can significantly increase the system’s probability of success. One way 
to assess individual attitudes about consent and data-sharing for biobanks is to directly 
ask individuals about their attitudes and values. Of the 13,000 individuals surveyed for 
one study, 66% indicated that they would participate in a biobank, and 88% indicated that 
they wanted to know the repercussions for misuse of their data (Sanderson et. al., 2017). 
In addition to assessing individual attitudes about participating in a biobank, an 
assessment of individual values and preferences should be undertaken prior to enrolling 
in a system like Lifespan. Previous studies have surveyed public opinions about 
participating in large genetic cohort studies as well as public preferences for returning 
results from genetic research (Bollinger et. al., 2014; Kaufman et. al., 2008). A Patient 
Value Index (PVI) could establish norms and expectations for each individual including 
re-contact regarding new discoveries, desire to know or avoid information, risk and 
uncertainty tolerance, willingness for disclosure of information to immediate family 
regarding heritable disease, potential for self-harm with disclosure of a terminal genetic 
condition, and if relaying information is acceptable even if a potential change in self-
perception or identity could occur. A standardized Patient Value Index (PVI) could help 
clinicians as well as patients navigate the complexity of individual values and beliefs by 
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identifying in advance how they would like to interact with the system and the 
information it provides both currently and in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
 Disease is a complex continuum that is rarely binary, and the constant yearning to 
simplify and understand complexity especially for diseases is part of human nature. A 
shift in individual understanding will need to occur for many complex disease states like 
obesity, diabetes, autism, and heart disease. Risk for developing a disease can be 
powerful for an individual even when uncertainty is present. For some individuals, 
knowing risk provides the ability to increase proactive planning and interventions by 
initiating continuous monitoring, modifying behavior and environment, joining disease 
advocate groups, and taking preventive measures including prophylactic surgery. For 
other individuals, knowing risk combined with uncertainty causes paralysis, anxiety, and 
disrupts daily life. Both individuals and their values should be able to co-exist and 
interact with a socio-technical system like Lifespan, and the design of the system will be 
strengthened by involving multiple stakeholders with differing values from its inception. 
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